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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AVIATION CASE
LAW
ROBERT J. O'CONNELL*
I. CASES INVOLVING ACTIONS AGAINST COMMON CARRIERS
PERHAPS THE LAST chapter of The Right Stuff' was
played out in the courtroom testimony of Frank Borman
and Scott Crossfield in Arnold v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.2 Bor-
man, President and Board Chairman of Eastern, testified that
there was nothing improper in the action of the Eastern Air-
lines crew in shutting off the terrain warning alert s shortly
before Flight 212 crashed into the ground three miles short of
the runway at Charlotte, and that an extraneous conversation
among the crew, recorded on the cockpit voice recorder, was
not unusual or unsafe. Crossfield, former Vice-President of
Eastern, testified that, in the words of the court, "such con-
duct is both ill-advised and indicative of a fatal compla-
cency."' The court found the crew guilty of gross negligence in
the numerous omissions and lapses of duty described in the
opinion.6
Defendant Eastern contended that the air traffic control
system's failure to monitor the approach of Flight 212 to the
* Robert J. O'Connell Ph.B. (Loyola-Chicago); J.D.(Georgetown); LL.M. (Int. Law)
(New York University); Professor of Law, John Marshall Law School (Chicago); Ad-
mitted to practice in the District of Columbia and Wisconsin.
T. Wolfe, THE RIGHT STUFF (1979).
16 Av. Cas. 17,592 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 14, 1980).
• A terrain warning alert displays a warning light and emits a piercing whistle
whenever the descent is within 1,000 feet of the ground. Id. at 17,594.
Id. at 17,595.
I ld. at 17,604.
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runway, with respect to its height above the ground, made the
United States negligent. Eastern also claimed a failure of
duty by the United States in its omission to warn Flight 212
of the dangerously low altitude observed by the approach con-
troller operating from the ARTS (automated radar terminal
system, which associates alphanumeric computer data with ra-
dar responses) and from the TRACON (terminal radar ap-
proach control, in the radar room and in the tower cab).7 Af-
ter examining the FAA manuals and directives, the experience
of pilots and controllers, and the nature and purpose of the
ARTS III in use at the time of the crash of Flight 212, the
court held that there was no duty on the part of the United
States to use the ARTS in such a fashion.8 The court found
that there was no breach of duty to warn of a known danger,
since the air traffic controllers had not observed the danger to
Flight 212 until it had already crashed.' The court further ob-
served that the danger to the flight was so great as a result of
the negligence of the crew that no warning would have
avoided the disaster. 10
II. CASES ON PRODUCT LiAmLiTy
Those who may have feared that the trend of products lia-
bility law would eventually produce atrophy of the human
brain may take some comfort from the decision in Kroon v.
Beech Aircraft Corp." In that case, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed summary judgment in favor of a defendant
manufacturer when the plaintiff, an experienced pilot, at-
temped to fly an airplane with a pin-type gust lock" in place
in the control column. Even though he was familiar with the
* Id. at 17,600.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 17,602-03.
9 Id. at 17,603-04.
10 Id. at 17,604.
" 628 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1980).
A gust lock "is designed to prevent damage to an airplane's control system by
keeping the movable surface of the airplane-the rudder, the elevators, and the aile-
rons-from moving in windy conditions." Id at 892. When the gust lock is engaged, it
is not possible to get the aircraft off the ground, though it can be maneuvered while
on the ground. Id.
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airplane and the gust lock system, the pilot commenced a
take-off roll without removing the gust lock."3 After realizing
part way down the runway that he could not operate the con-
trol system, the pilot steered the plane off the runway and
damaged it." The court rejected plaintiff's assertion that the
design of the gust lock or the manufacturer's failure to warn
users of its dangers contributed to the accident.15 The court
held that summary judgment was appropriate because a rea-
sonable jury could not disagree that it was solely the plain-
tiff's conduct that proximately caused the injury.1 6
A dissent by Judge Tate lent credence to plaintiff's view
that the design of the gust lock might have been found by the
jury to be defective, because the manufacturer was aware of
numerous accidents of a similar kind and had designed a fail-
safe gust lock system that was not installed on this plane,
even though the NTSB had indicated that remedial action
was required to correct gust locks of the type here involved.1 7
Judge Tate stated further that the "patent danger doctrine,"
which protects manufacturers who sell negligently designed
machines, should be rejected and that the jury should be per-
mitted to determine the apportionment of damages under
Florida's comparative negligence rule.1 6
Of similar thrust is Stevens v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 19 in
which plaintiff advanced the theory that, had the defendant
manufacturer posted the capacity of the aircraft in pounds of
cargo and number of passengers, the decedent, who was one of
three passengers, could have made his own determination that
the airplane was overloaded and thereby would not have re-
lied on the pilot's weight calculations.2 0 The court rejected the
plaintiff's argument on the ground that such a warning to a
passenger would be ineffective because "[w]hether the plane
I Id.
14 Id.
'5 Id. at 893-94.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 894.
' Id. at 895.
115 Cal. App. 3d 431, 170 Cal. Rptr. 925 (Ct. App. 1981).
,0 115 Cal. App. 3d at 433, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 926.
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can fly safely with a given total weight of passengers depends
upon too many additional factors for a passenger to make an
informed and intelligent judgment from such a notice. 2 1 In
addition, the court said that the passenger "necessarily de-
pends upon the skill and judgment of the pilot"22 and it would
be impossible to provide meaningful data to the passengers on
all that is required for the safe operation of the airplane.28 A
contrary holding would imply that a manufacturer has a duty
to post other meaningful information in the passenger com-
partment "to enable the passengers to second guess the pilot,"
which ultimately would not be in the interests of air safety."
Trust Corp. of Montana v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,"5 was a
"second collision" case.' Plaintiff's decedent had died in the
crash on takeoff of his 1965 Piper airplane. His personal rep-
resentative brought the action on a theory of strict liability in
tort, alleging that, while the original accident may have been
caused by the decedent's negligence in the operation of the
airplane, decedent's injuries were fatally enhanced by a defect
in the aircraft.'7 In a striking decision, the district court ac-
cepted the concept that a second collision case could be
grounded on the theory of strict liabilty in tort, providing the
plaintiff was able to show: (1) that the crash was survivable;
(2) that, in this case, the absence of a shoulder harness system
in the plane was an unreasonably dangerous defect; and (3)
that the defect caused decedent's enhanced injuries.2
The district court then held that the Montana Supreme
Court, if confronted with the question, would adopt the doc-
trine of "comparative fault" in product liability actions.' The
court described that proposition in this way: "Essentially, the
2, Id. at 433-34, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 926. None of those factors which might have
affected the calculation in this case were mentioned in the opinion.
I /d.
" 115 Cal. App. 3d at 434, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 926.
4 Id.
506 F. Supp. 1093 (D. Mont. 1981).
" "This case has been dubbed a 'second collision' action in which the defect, al-





doctrine recognizes that defendants are strictly liable for in-
jury caused from defective products, except that damages, if
any, are reduced in proportion to plaintiff's own contribution
to his loss or injury. Product liability defendants may to this
extent present evidence of plaintiff's culpable conduct as a
partial defense."' 0
In this holding the court supported the view expressed in
Daly v. General Motors,'1 that there would be no dilution of
the fundamental goals of strict liability in tort and that plain-
tiffs would continue to be relieved of the burden of showing
defendant's negligence but would suffer the loss of so much of
their potential recovery as is ascribable to the plaintiffs' own
negligence.3 2 The court noted that the majority of states con-
sidering the problem have adopted the rule of comparative
negligence in strict liability cases, notwithstanding the critical
rejection of the attempt to blend rules of negligence with the
theory of strict liability in tort. This criticism, the court sug-
gested, rested on an insistence on precise and fixed definitions
of legal concepts, rather than upon any practical difficulty."
In an action based on strict liability in tort, the court in
Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Jeppesen & Co.," held
that it was not clearly erroneous for the trial court to have
found Jeppesen's instrument approach charts defective. Aetna
alleged that while Jeppesen's charts were accurate, the scale
of the "plan" view'5 of the approach to Las Vegas Airport was
five times smaller than the scale of the "profile" view." The
scale of the juxtaposed plans on the approach chart, therefore,
appeared to be the same at first glance.'7 The appellate court
then found that the district court was in error in concluding
30 Id.
1 20 Cal. 3d 725, 975 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978).
:1 506 F. Supp. at 1095.
3 Id.
3 642 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1981). 0
35 The plan view is the "view from the top of an object." J. FoVE & D. CI IN,
AIRCRAFT TECHNICAL DICTIONARY 130 (1978).
642 F.2d at 342. The profile view is a "side view. . . a view of anything in con-
tour." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 1134 (2d Col-
lege ed. 1972).
" 642 F.2d at 342.
1982]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
that, while the pilots of the plane had relied on the graphic
chart and had been misled into believing that they were free
to fly at an altitude of 3,100 feet, they were not negligent in
omitting observation of the printed material showing the cor-
rect data about the chart. 6 The court concluded that the
damages should be apportioned."
In Pioneer Seed Co. v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,40 a federal dis-
trict court held Cessna negligent in the manufacture of a
Model 441 aircraft whose nosewheel collapsed under normal
operating conditions."1 The court added that use of the part
which had failed (a nosegear trunnion lug) was a design de-
fect, as was the use of a certain steel washer which cut into
the lug's radius.4'
In Meil v. Piper Aircraft Corp.," a pilot was injured in the
crash of a spraying plane manufactured by defendant. Plain-
tiff sued, alleging both negligence in design and manufacture,
and strict liability in tort." First, he argued that the negli-
gence of the manufacturer in fabricating a cutter bar which
was attached to the landing gear and meant to sever wires
with which the plane might otherwise collide, was the cause of
his accident." The cutter bar was shown to have been manu-
factured from steel too soft to cut wire. The court held that
there was adequate evidence to support this postulate." Sec-
ond, the plaintiff argued that his injuries were enhanced by
the failure of the manufacturer to incorporate into the design
a safety belt with a latch sufficiently easy to operate to permit
plaintiff to release himself from the overturned airplane
before he was seriously burned by the fire following the
crash.' The court also upheld the verdict and judgment below
8 Id. at 343.
" Id. at 343-49. The court of appeals applied California law to apportion damages
on the basis of comparative fault. Id.
, 16 Av. Cas. 17,941 (E.D. Va. Aug.25, 1981).
Id. at 17,943.
42 Id.
" 658 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1981).
4 Id. at 788.
" Id. at 789.
" Id. at 789-90.
47 Id. at 790.
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as to this claim.48
In LaBelle v. McCauley Industrial Corp.49 the First Circuit
Court of Appeals held negligent the manufacturer of a propel-
ler which cracked and caused damage to the aircraft. Liability
was based on the failure to warn the airplane's owner of a de-
fect or dangerous condition in its product.50 The court upheld
the jury's finding of negligence, even though a service bulletin
published by the manufacturer about a year and a half before
the accident required destruction of the part and its replace-
ment. The publication took place after the time of an over-
haul of the particular propeller by an authorized repair sta-
tion. 1 The court reasoned that the jury was warranted in
finding that such indirect notice constituted an inadequate
method of warning and thus a negligent failure to warn.52
In Hersch v. Rockwell International Corp.,53 a federal dis-
trict court applied Kentucky law in a wrongful death action
based upon a theory of design defect, holding that Kentucky
requires "precisely focused proof on both design defect and
causation" and that merely "proving that the product was in-
volved in an accident is insufficient" as a basis for liability.5
The court also held as insufficient the evidence that the de-
fendant could have made some modifications to the design of
its airplane which might have prevented the accident. The
court specifically stated that plaintiff's proof that defendant's
design failed to meet a spin-recovery design criterion known
as the "tail-damping power factor" was merely proof that
there was a possible alternate design.55 The court found fur-
ther that the failure of defendant to spin-test the airplane was
not negligence, and that the Federal Aviation Administration
48 Id. at 790-91. In the trial court, the jury entered a general verdict for the plain-
tiff. Id. at 789.
49 649 F.2d 46 (1st Cir. 1981).
0 Id. at 50. The defect involved the lack of a needed rounding and polishing opera-
tion on the propeller hub, causing fatigue cracks to form. Id. at 49.
81 Id. at 49.
82 Id.
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does not require the airplane in question to be spin-tested.6
In Ferguson v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,5 7 plaintiffs' representa-
tives brought wrongful death actions against Cessna Aircraft
Company after the crash of a Centurion 210L whose wing fell
off over the Caribbean.5" The plaintiffs' evidence indicated
that wing flutter was the cause of the detachment and that
the flutter resulted from a loose aileron cable, which permit-
ted the aileron to move freely and, hence, to flutter. The same
witness testified that the flutter would not have occurred if
the ailerons had been "statically mass balanced," instead of
being designed to rely on tension established by the aileron
cable to keep them from fluttering.8 9 The witness testified
that this constituted a design defect. The court held that
plaintiffs "showed that the airplane failed to perform as safely
as an ordinary consumer would expect when using it in an in-
tended or reasonably foreseeable manner", ° that this type of
design defect gave rise to strict liability in tort, and that it
was not necessary, therefore, for plaintiffs to prove Cessna was
negligent. 1
III. CASES INVOLVING FORUM NON CONVENIENS
In the long-awaited decision by the Supreme Court in Piper
Aircraft Co. v. Reyno,62 the judgment of the district court was
affirmed and that of the court of appeals reversed. In Reyno
the actions against Piper were eventually filed in the Middle
District of Pennsylvania, where the motion to dismiss for fo-
rum non conveniens was made and granted by the district
court. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court re-
versed the court of appeals, primarily on the ground that it
was error to allow the plaintiffs to resist the motion to dismiss
for forum non conveniens merely by showing that the sub-
stantive law of the alternative forum would be less favorable
" Id..
87 16 Av. Cas. 18,008 (Ariz. Ct. App. Oct. 14, 1981).
Id. at 18,009.
" Id.
I ld. at 18,010.
Id.
62 102 S. Ct. 252 (1981).
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to the plaintiffs than that of the original forum. 3 The Su-
preme Court held that the possibility of change in substantive
law should not ordinarily be given conclusive or even substan-
tial weight in the forum non conveniens inquiry." The posi-
tion of the Supreme Court was based, not only on prior deci-
sions of the Court, but on reason as well. The Court asserted
that both the need for flexibility, as well as the value of the
forum non conveniens rule, might be lost altogether under the
interpretation applied by the court of appeals, because in the
majority of cases, plaintiffs choose the forum on the basis of
its advantageous law." The Court added that the practical
problems created by the court of appeals rule might be insu-
perable because the analysis of whether the change of forum
would be advantageous would be critical and inordinately
complex." Finally, the Court thought that the view of the
court of appeals would cause further congestion in the courts
of the United States since American law presumably is always
more favorable to the plaintiff than foreign law would be.
The Supreme Court instead approved application by the
district court of the public and private interests standards es-
tablished in Gulf Oil Corporation v. Gilbert," including the
district court's holding that the resident's or citizen's choice of
forum might be given greater weight than the choice of forum
by a nonresident or foreign plaintiff. 9 The Court reasoned
that, when the home forum of the plaintiff has been chosen, it
is reasonable to assume that this choice is convenient, but
when the choice is that of a foreign plaintiff, such an assump-
tion of convenience is not so reasonable. 70 The Supreme Court
also approved the district court's holding that the private in-
terests analysis favored suit in Scotland, the site of the crash,
partially because "the problems posed by the inability to im-
63 Id. at 261.
4 Id.
85 Id. at 262-63.
*. Id. at 263.
:7 Id. at 263-64.
s 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
102 S. Ct. at 265-66.
7I Id.
19821
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plead potential third party defendants clearly supported hold-
ing the trial in Scotland.""1
Observers of the attractive advertisements of Singapore Air-
lines appearing in the daily press, 72 as well as the airline's at-
torneys, will be cheered by the decision of the New York
County Special Term of the Supreme Court of New York in
Aboujdid v. Gulf Aviation Co.13 The court in Aboujdid held
that New York was an appropriate forum for the trial of ac-
tions against Singapore Airlines and others for personal inju-
ries suffered by a group of French, English, Israeli, Canadian
and American passengers, hijacked while on board an Air
France jet en route from Tel Aviv to Paris. An action against
Air France, brought in Illinois by many of the same passen-
gers who were rescued in the famous Entebbe raid, was dis-
missed by the Illinois Supreme Court in People ex. rel Air
France v. Giliberto on the ground of forum non conveniens.74
In Aboujdid, Singapore Airlines was accused of negligence
in screening passengers in Bahrain, some of whom were al-
leged to be the hijackers, thus allowing the hijackers eventu-
ally to board the Air France plane without further search
when they changed planes in Athens. 5 In its search for an
appropriate forum, the court recited the criteria that con-
trolled in an application of the rule in Varkonyi v. S. A. Em-
presa de Viacao Airea Rio Granderse (Varig).7 Included in
this recitation was the statement from Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gil-
bert,77 that the plaintiff's choice of forum should not be dis-
turbed unless the balance is strongly in favor of the
defendant.78
Much of the rest of the Aboujdid opinion constitutes an ex-
amination of the superiority of one forum over the other fo-
71 Id. at 267.
"' See N.Y. Times, November 30, 1981.
73 108 Misc. 2d 175, 437 N.Y.S.2d 219 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980), aff'd 448 N.Y.S.2d 427
(N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
"' 74 I1.2d 90, 383 N.E.2d 977 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 932 (1979).
75 Id. at 979.
7- 22 N.Y.2d 333, 239 N.E.2d 542, 292 N.Y.S.2d 670 (1968).
77 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
76 437 N.Y.S.2d at 221.
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rums that might be selected by the plaintiff or to which the
case could migrate if it were dismissed in New York. The
court rejected all the potential forums except the United
Kingdom and Bahrain and then concentrated upon the appro-
priateness of the United Kingdom (U.K.). The court noted
that Singapore Airlines operated both in New York and the
U.K., but that none of the plaintiffs were U.K. residents,
while four of the plaintiffs were New York residents. 79 The
discovery procedures of the U.K. were compared to those of
New York and the United States and were found more restric-
tive. The court examined the convenience of the two forums
from the point of view of international witnesses and con-
cluded that it would be just as convenient for witnesses to
come to New York as it would be to come to the United King-
dom, and perhaps less expensive." Finally, the court noted
that much legal work already had been done in New York and
that most of the passengers had begun their ill-fated journey
in New York. For these reasons the motion to dismiss for fo-
rum non conveniens was denied."
The Texas Supreme Court, in Helicopteros Nacionales de
Columbia v. Hall,8 affirmed the dismissal of a wrongful death
action against the Columbian helicopter company which arose
out of a crash in Peru in which four persons were killed. The
supreme court concluded that the court of civil appeals im-
properly restricted the scope of the Texas long-arm statute.83
The supreme court held that the Texas long-arm statute
reaches to the limits permitted by the United States Constitu-
tion; therefore, the court analyzed the facts in the case to de-
termine if exercise of jurisdiction by a Texas court would be
violative of due process.8 4 Examining the contacts of the de-
fendant with Texas in light of recent United States Supreme
Court decisions on personal jurisdiction, the state supreme
court concluded that the assertion of jurisdiction over the Co-
79 Id. at 220-21.
Id. at 221-22.
Si Id. at 222.
16 Av. Cas. 18,389 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1982).
*8 Id. at 18,391. See VERNONS ANN. Txx. STAT. art. 2031b (West 1981).
16 Av. Cas. at 18,391-92.
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lombian helicopter company was unconstitutional. 85
The other side of this coin may be seen in Adipaz, Ltd. v.
Swiss Air Transport, Ltd.,86 in which the trial court dis-
missed, under forum non conveniens, an action in New York
for property damage to cargo arising from an accident at Chi-
cago-O'Hare International Airport, even though the defendant
maintained an office in New York. The court relied on the fact
that witnesses could be residents of other forums."7
The plaintiff responded to defendant's motion to dismiss on
grounds of forum non conveniens in Grodinsky v. Fairchild
Industries, Inc.," by suggesting that the court transfer the
case instead to the district of Maryland. The tranfer took
place and defendant moved again for dismissal on the grounds
of forum non conveniens." Plaintiff argued that such a mo-
tion was barred by the earlier decision in the transferor court,
but the Maryland district court held that the order, under
section 1404(a) of 28 U.S.C., transferring an action to another
district has no res judicata effect. The Maryland court was
therefore free to entertain the motion to dismiss on the same
grounds.90
The court went on to hold that the action should be dis-
missed because the Canadian accident involved Canadian
plaintiffs and a Canadian owner of the aircraft. The only con-
nection with the United States and the district of Maryland
was that the defendant manufacturer was a Maryland citizen
and the airplane had been manufactured in Maryland twenty
years before." The court found that Canada had a greater in-
terest in the outcome of the case than Maryland, and that the
defendant was amenable to process in Canada and was willing
to produce witnesses there."
8' Id. at 18,392-93.
16 Av. Cas. 17,580 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 15, 1981).
87 Id..
507 F. Supp. 1245 (D. Md. 1981).
" Id. at 1247-48.
80 Id. at 1248.
9" Id. at 1249-50.
11 Id. at 1251-52.
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In Kahn v. United Technologies Corp.,9a some of the ac-
tions arising from the 1978 crash of a Sikorsky helicopter in
the North Sea were brought in the Connecticut circuit court,
after dismissal from the federal court was affirmed on the
ground of forum non conveniens. The Connecticut Superior
Court then entertained defendant's motion to dismiss on the
same ground and found that it had the power to dismiss con-
ditionally, just as the federal court had done, based on the
defendant's amenability to suit in Norway, the site of the ac-
cident.95 The court then examined the factors and circum-
stances affecting dismissal and concluded that the weight of
those factors was in favor of retention of jurisdiction." The
court seemed influenced primarily by the fact that the heli-
copter was manufactured in Connecticut, the presence there
of experts who examined the wreckage, and the interests of
Connecticut in the outcome of a products liability case involv-
ing a product certified by the United States. 7
The California appellate decision in Hemmelgarb v. Boeing
Co.98 illustrates similarities between the process by which a
court decides whether to dismiss a case on forum non con-
veniens grounds and the process by which a court decides
what law shall apply. It also demonstrates the agony of spirit
which seems to exude from opinions in which courts make
these decisions through a scrupulous, point-by-point examina-
tion of the elements entering into the choice. The similarity is
so significant that strict attention is required to avoid confu-
sion with cases in the other field. In Hemmelgarb, the court
was asked whether the actions brought in California ought to
be dismissed for forum non conveniens. The actions arose af-
ter a Boeing 737 operated by Pacific Western Airlines crashed
as the pilot attempted to abort the landing upon seeing a
snow-sweeper on the runway.9 The thrust reversers, which
16 Av. Cas. 17,651 (Conn. Super. Ct. March 3, 1981).
Id. at 17,652.
"5 Id.
" Id. at 17,652-53.
9Id.
98 106 Cal. App. 3d 576, 165 Cal. Rptr. 190 (1980).
99 106 Cal. App. 3d at 583, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 193. Pacific Western Airline was not
1982]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
had already been extended, failed to retract on the "go-
around" and the plane crashed. 00 The Canadian municipality
operating the airport was responsible for sweeping the runway
and the Canadian air traffic controller was responsible for al-
erting the sweeper of the imminent landing of aircraft.' 1
The court catalogued the usual grounds upon which the de-
cision to dismiss for forum non conveniens is made, emphasiz-
ing that the possibility of a larger damage award in California
was not an acceptable basis for such a decision. ' The only
connection between California and the accident was the
state's position as the residence of the manufacturer of certain
thrust reverser components designed by Boeing in California.
The court acknowledged the interest of California in litigation
concerning a resident manufacturer, but added that there was
no possibility of satisfying the interests of every state in every
case of this kind.108 The court concluded, largely based on the
presence of witnesses in Canada and the amenability to pro-
cess of certain defendants exclusively in Canada, that Canada
was a more convenient forum. The case was, therefore,
dismissed.'
A federal district court in Orion Insurance Co. v. United
Technologies Corp.05 followed Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,'" in
requiring the weighing of the public interests of the states in-
volved and the private interests of the litigants, including the
strong interest of the plaintiff who chose the forum."0 7 The
accident arose out of a crash in the North Sea, off the coast of
the United Kingdom, of a helicopter manufactured by a Con-
necticut defendant. 0 8 Defendant's principal place of business
was Connecticut, but the business was a Delaware corpora-




"'0 106 Cal. App. 3d at 586, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 195.
103 106 Cal. App. 3d at 589, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 197.
104 106 Cal. App. 3d at 590-91, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 197-98.
105 15 Av. Cas. 18,061 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
330 U.S. 501 (1947).
'o 15 Av. Cas. at 18,061.
IO ld.
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Plaintiff filed another action against defendant in the
United Kingdom and acknowledged that the action com-
menced in New York was intended to protect plaintiff's strict
liability action, because that claim was unavailable in the
U.K.109 The court saw at once that New York had no connec-
tion with the suit, and acknowledged that a greater interest in
the outcome of the litigation lay either in Connecticut or the
United Kingdom.110 The court held that public interest in the
outcome of the suit outweighed the plaintiff's private interest
in maintaining suit in New York since all of the technical data
touching the accident were either in Connecticut or the
U.K."' Insofar as the private interests of the litigants were
concerned, the court concluded that, though a clear advantage
flowed to plaintiff from suit in New York based on strict lia-
bility in tort, the inconvenience of the forum outweighed the
private interest of the plaintiff."' The court noted that the
emasculation of the whole doctrine of forum non conveniens
would result from the retention of litigation merely because of
the availability of better law from the plaintiff's point of view
in the forum. Thus retention was precluded and the motion
for dismissal was granted.
The Gulf Oil decision was also followed in Dasi v. Air In-
dia."' Plaintiff, a four-year old child, was traveling with her
guardian from New York to New Delhi on Air India on a tick-
et purchased in New York. While being transported on a mov-
ing walkway at Orly Airport in Paris plaintiff caught her hand
in the handrail and was injured. Plaintiffs were California re-
sidents, and brought suit in New York against Air India and
Orly Airport. Both defendants moved to dismiss on the
ground of forum non conveniens, a question with which the
court dealt after satisfying itself that it had jurisdiction of
both defendants." 4 The court reasoned that, while solicitation
of business alone is not a sufficient basis for the exercise of
o Id. at 18,062. Strict liability is presently not recognized in Great Britain. Id.
110 Id. at 18,062.
"I Id.
Id.
16 Av. Cas. 17,308 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 1981).
" Id. at 17,309.
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jurisdiction, solicitation plus sales and promotion activities
carried out in a permanent office are sufficient.115
Among the private interests which the court examined in
accordance with the criteria of Gulf Oil, were the sources of
physical, documentary and testimonial proof. The court found
that these sources of proof were more readily and more inex-
pensively available in Paris.* 6 In addition, the court found, on
the basis of expert testimony, that a New York judgment
could not be enforced in France against the airport authority,
but the court concluded that this fact was of questionable
weight because plaintiff had chosen to run this risk.11 7 The
court, therefore, saw that many practical problems would be
eliminated by allowing the case to be moved to Paris.
The court held that the balance of conveniences justified
the transfer to Paris, the site of the accident, where a strong
public interest in the outcome of the litigation existed. The
court added that the French law governing the case could be
more ably applied in a French court. 8 Accordingly, the case
was dismissed on the conditions of consent to the French ju-
risdiction by the defendants, waiver of claims under the stat-
ute of limitations by defendants, and consent to satisfy any
judgment rendered against the defendants in France. '1
Pain v. United Technologies Corp.,2 may well stand as a
model for the application of the principles laid down in Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,'2' and Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual
Casualty Co.' 22 In Pain, a helicopter manufactured by defen-
dant in Connecticut crashed in the North Sea off the coast of
Norway. The helicopter was owned by a Norwegian corpora-
tion and was en route from the coast of Norway to an offshore
Id.
I d. at 17,310.
Id. at 17,310-11. The defendant produced evidence that a judgment entered
against it would be unenforcable because France consigns cases brought against it to
local administrative tribunals. Id.
,' Id. at 17,311.
"i' Id.
120 637 F.2d 775 (D.D.C. 1980).
121 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
122 330 U.S. 518 (1947).
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oil platform.' 23 The passengers who died or were injured in
the crash were French, Norwegian, British, American and dual
Norwegian-Canadian citizens. The crash was investigated by a
Norwegian government agency and the wreckage, as well as
the investigative reports and the investigators, was in Nor-
way.12 4 All plaintiffs brought suit in the District of Columbia,
though only one was an American citizen.
The court proceeded along familiar lines: first, determining
the number of possible alternative jurisdictions for the action;
second, systematically weighing each of the factors which the
Gilbert decision required to be accounted for when balancing
the conveniences for private parties; third, allowing a pre-
sumption of the soundness of the plaintiff's choice of forum;
fourth, when the private interests are in equipoise, consider-
ing the interests of the all states involved; and fifth, if a for-
eign court is found more appropriate for the suit, assuring
that the action will be subject to prosecution in that forum
without undue prejudice or hardship to the plaintiff. 2 ' The
court concluded that there were other forums with greater ac-
cess to sources of proof than the District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia, and that the courts of Norway would be
able to implead the Norwegian corporate owner of the heli-
copter, which would be impossible in the United States.'"
The court also found that there were no significant contacts
between the accident and the District of Columbia, and that
the litigation would constitute a burden on the chosen forum
which it could not rightly be forced to bear.' 7 The court
found, too, that Norway's interest in the outcome of the litiga-
tion was greater, indicating that its law would probably apply
to the case.'28 Finally, the court concluded that the suits were
rightly dismissed for forum non conveniens, despite the Amer-
,13 637 F.2d at 779.
124 Id. at 780.
'" Id. at 781-84.
111 Id. at 790-91. The Norwegian corporate owner of the helicopter had no contacts
with the United States and was thus not subject to the personal jurisdiction of the
United States courts. Id. at 780.
127 Id. at 792.
" Id. at 793.
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ican citizenship of some of the plaintiffs. The court intimated
that the American citizenship of a plaintiff was only one of
the private factors to be considered, and not one which enti-
tled the plaintiff to greater consideration in its choice of fo-
rum than would be given another plaintiff. 12 9
Fosen v. United Technologies Corp.,'30 also involved a
wrongful death action arising out of a helicopter crash that
occurred in the North Sea off the coast of Norway. The plain-
tiffs were five Norwegian citizens suing as personal represent-
atives of five Norwegians killed while being transported to a
mobile drilling rig owned by the Phillips Petroleum Company.
The cause of the crash was undetermined. 31 Defendant
United Technologies, a United States corporation, manufac-
tured the helicopter and sold it in 1971 to defendant All Nip-
pon Airways Co., Ltd. (ANA), a Japanese corporation which
later sold the craft to a Norwegian company not a party to
this action. ANA also had a subsidiary, ANA Americas, li-
censed to do business in California, Washington, and New
York."
The plaintiffs, suing in New York, alleged defective design,
manufacture or maintenance of the helicopter and based their
jurisdictional assertion on diversity of citizenship"' and the
Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA)." ' Defendant ANA
moved to dismiss the suit for lack of personal jurisdiction.
ANA Americas moved for summary judgment, or in the alter-
native, dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted, and defendant United Technology pleaded
forum non conveniens."' ANA's only New York contact was
its financial representative, located there to negotiate loans
with banks in the city. The plaintiffs alleged that this fact in-
dicated that ANA was "doing business" under the New York
'2 Id. at 797-98.
484 F. Supp. 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
"3 Id. at 493.
1" Id.
133 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976).
34 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1975).
131 484 F. Supp. at 494.
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jurisdictional standard. " '
First, the district court addressed the jurisdictional ques-
tion and held that the court could not assert jurisdiction over
defendant ANA based on diversity because the plaintiffs were
Norwegian and the defendant (ANA) was Japanese. Diversity
jurisdiction could not be maintained over foreign litigants. 7
Secondly, the court held that jurisdiction was also improper
under DOHSA because the act required sufficient contacts be-
tween the United States and the transaction giving rise to the
claims against ANA. " The court noted that this test was not
met because there was no evidence of negligent design or
manufacture within the United States on ANA's part, nor was
the presence of an ANA Americas financial agent in New York
a sufficient contact. ANA Americas' presence in three states
was too insignificant a contact to make the United States
ANA's "base of operations. '"I 9 Thirdly, the court recognized
that ANA Americas' summary judgment motion was granted
because, even after discovery, the plaintiffs had neither
presented any evidence demonstrating the existence of a gen-
uine factual issue nor explained their inability to do 80.140
Finally, the court granted United Technologies' motion to
dismiss on the grounds of forum non conveniens on the condi-
tion that the defendants: (1) submit to jurisdiction in Norway;
(2) make all witnesses and documents within their control
available in the Norwegian action; and (3) pay any judgment
rendered by a Norwegian court.M  The public interest was in
having "local controversies decided at home."1 42 Since no ele-
ment of the lawsuit was related to New York in any way, and
since Norway had the substantial interest in the outcome, the
court weighed the interests and dismissed the litigation.
In Macedo v. Boeing Co., M a federal district court dealt
16 Id.
... Id. at 495.
' Id. at 495-96.
3 Id. at 497.
" Id. at 501.
"' Id. at 503.
141 Id. at 504.
"1 15 Av. Cas. 18,032 (D. Ill. 1980).
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with and dismissed three lawsuits arising from the crash of an
aircraft in Portugal. An airliner owned and operated by
Transportes Aereos Portugueses (TAP) crashed on landing at
Funchal Airport, killing one-hundred thirty-two persons
aboard and injuring thirty-two persons. Only six of the one-
hundred thirty-nine plaintiffs were Americans. Illinois, where
the suit was brought, was not the residence of the American
plaintiffs, and this forum bore no relation to any issue rele-
vant to the litigation." 
-
The court granted the motion to dismiss the first suit be-
cause of the lack of diversity between all plaintiffs and the
defendants, who were eight American manufacturers and
TAP. The two additional actions were filed in Illinois at a
later date. In one of these suits, there were two plaintiffs from
Georgia, three from Florida and one from New York, while
the sole defendant was TAP. In the other action, none of the
plaintiffs was American, though the defendant was the Ameri-
can Boeing Corporation. The complaint against Boeing al-
leged wrongful death based upon products liability and breach
of warranty, while the complaint against TAP alleged negli-
gence.145 Thus, the plaintiffs appeared to have cured the juris-
dictional defect of the initial action.
The federal district court, in a memorandum decision, dis-
missed the two later actions on the ground of forum non con-
veniens, subject to the condition that the defendants submit
to the jurisdiction of the Portuguese courts. " 6 The court
based its ruling on Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert14 7 because the
question to be determined was whether the courts of Portugal
would provide a significantly more convenient alternative fo-
rum, due to the availability of evidence and witnesses in that
country. Dismissal on the basis of forum non conveniens is not
proper when there exists a significantly more convenient fed-
eral forum to which the action may instead be transferred
144 Id. at 18,032.
"0 Id. at 18,032-33.
" Id. at 18,035.
330 U.S. 501 (1947).
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under 28 U.S.C. 1404(a).14 8 As the court pointed out, however,
federal courts retain jurisdiction and discretion to dismiss an
action when the more convenient forum is foreign.1 49
In Macedo, the wreckage of the aircraft, airport, witnesses,
maintenance records, air traffic controllers, documents relat-
ing to the operating procedures of TAP, flight data recorder
and transcripts of conversations of the crew, and official inves-
tigations and reports were all in Portugal. Moreover, defen-
dants were willing to submit to the jurisdiction of the courts
of Portugal. The fact that the aircraft was manufactured in
the United States did not render the accident, involving a
Portugese airline and airport, and predominantly Portuguese
plaintiffs and witnesses, any less a matter of local Portuguese
interest.1 50 On this basis, the court found that Portugal had
substantially more contact with the suits and provided a sub-
stantially more convenient forum for the "just and total" dis-
position of the claims of both the American and foreign
plaintiffs.1 51
IV. WARSAW CONVENTION CASES
An intriguing argument was examined and then dismissed
by the court in the otherwise routine opinion offered in Bank
of Nova Scotia v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.ls2 The
argument suggested by both parties was that the Hague Pro-
tocol, 153 which was signed but never ratified by the United
States,15 4 ought to be applied by the court because it would be
applied in either Canada, the country of departure, or El Sal-
vador, the country of destination, both of which adhere to the
Hague Protocol.15 5 The court found no difference in the appli-
cation of the Warsaw Convention or the Hague Protocol to
,' 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976).
149 15 Av. Cas. at 18,035.
150 Id. at 18,034.
11 Id.
, 16 Av. Cas. 17,378 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 1981).
,63 The Hague Protocol is reprinted in CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, AERONAUTICAL
STATUTES AND RELATED MATERIAL 324-66 (1963).
I'l 16 Av. Cas. at 17,380.
155 Id. at 17,378-79.
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the case because the meaning of "wilful misconduct" in the
latter convention coincided with that of the former.156 The
view suggested by the parties would have created a choice of
law issue, rather than a question of the application of domes-
tic law derived from treaties and the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution, an interesting dichotomy, indeed.
In one of the rare recent decisions holding the Warsaw Con-
vention applicable and limiting the liability of the carrier to
the $75,000, as provided by the carrier agreement at Montreal,
a New York appellate court in Manion v. Pan American
World Airways, Inc.,15 7 held the failure of the carrier to de-
liver a ticket to plaintiff on the first leg of a round trip from
New York to Saudi Arabia, did not exclude the treaty's limi-
tation of liability, since a ticket was delivered during an inter-
mediate stop in Rome several hours before the continuation of
her journey.15 8 In reaching its conclusion that the flight was
not an indivisible unit, the appellate court seemed to rely on
the fact that the ticket issued by the carrier provided separate
flight coupons for each leg of the trip and that the journey
was interrupted by the passenger in Rome. " "
The Warsaw Convention' e was held inapplicable in Adam-
sons v. American Airlines, Inc.,6 ' a case in which a plaintiff
sought damages for personal injury claimed to have resulted
from American Airlines' refusal to board her after she had
made an advanced flight reservation for a trip from Haiti to
New York. Plaintiff was traveling to New York for medical
'56 Id. at 17,380. On the facts of the case, the court held that the deliberate omis-
sion by the defendant carrier's agent to place a parcel of gold grain into a special
"valuables sack," provided by the carrier for security, eliminated the limitation of
liability provided under the Warsaw Convention. Id. The court concluded that such
an act was "willful conduct." Id.
117 80 App. Div. 2d 303, 439 N.Y.S.2d 6 (1981).
"l 439 N.Y.S.2d at 8-9. The plaintiff was injured when terrorists attacked the
plane at Rome, one of the scheduled intermediate stops on the flight. Id. at 7.
Id. at 8-9.
'6 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000 (1936), T.S. No. 876 (effective Oct.
29, 1934) (codified at 49 U.S.C. !el 1502 (1976)) [hereinafter cited as the Warsaw
Convention].
16' 16 Av. Cas. 17,195 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 31, 1980).
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treatment of a severe illness contracted while in Haiti."' At
trial, her expert medical witness testified that the "cata-
strophic consequences" of her illness could have been avoided,
had the airline not refused to board her."'3 In defense, Ameri-
can asserted a tariff provision which permitted it to deny
boarding, if such action was necessary for the safety of the
plaintiff or other passengers, or if plaintiff required special as-
sistance. American Airlines argued that its liability should be
limited to $75,000 provided by the Warsaw Convention and
Montreal Agreement.'" The court affirmed the jury's verdict,
finding that American was negligent in failing to gather infor-
mation necessary for the accurate and informed application of
its tariff provision. The court reasoned that the Warsaw Con-
vention was inapplicable because plaintiff never became a
passenger, there was no accident under the terms of the Con-
vention, and plaintiff was not embarking or disembarking. 165
Under the Warsaw Convention, a two year statute of limita-
tions is applicable to actions for loss or damage to checked
baggage.' 66 The calculation of the two year period, however, is
to be accomplished in accordance with the law of the forum.167
In Joseph v. Syrian Arab Airlines,68 the plaintiff claimed
that its earlier, timely filed action tolled the statute of limita-
tions under a New York law which so provided, in cases in
which the earlier action had been terminated because of a
"technical defect.'"" In Joseph, the court held instead that
the earlier action was not terminated by reason of a technical
defect, but rather because of a voluntary discontinuance by
the plaintiff, a reason specifically excluded by the law permit-
142 Id. at 17,196.
Id.
144 Id. at 17,197. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 160; Agreement, C.A.B.
18900, approved C.A.B. Order No. E23680, Docket 17325, May 13, 1966, 44 CAB Rep.
819 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Montreal Agreement].
"68 16 Av. Cas. at 17,197-98. Plaintiff was given judgment for $500,000. Id. at
17,198.
' Warsaw Convention, supra note 160, Art. 29.
147 Id.
88 F.R.D. 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
Id. at 532.
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ting the time extension.17 0 More importantly, said the court,
the defendants in the case were not the same as those in the
earlier action and hence did not have fair notice of the plain-
tiff's action.1 1 The existence of such notice was the factor on
which the New York law permitting the extension of time was
based." 2
In DeMarco v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 73 the
court held that the two-year statute of limitations did apply
to an action for loss or delay of baggage, even though the
claim check issued to the plaintiff did not advise of the appli-
cability of the Warsaw Convention rules.
Following the precedent in a majority of cases, the court in
Kordich v. Butler Aviation Detroit,14 held that the Warsaw
Convention statute of limitations continues to control, even
though the defendant carrier is guilty of wilful misconduct.17 5
The Kordich court ruled that the statute of limitations is not
a provision of the Convention which "excludes or limits" lia-
bility of the carrier in accordance with the terms of Article
25(1) of the Convention, but instead is a provision which es-
tablishes a bar to the enforcement of the liability. 7 6
In Georgakis v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 7 plaintiff, a Greek
seaman, sued for personal injuries arising from the crash of an
Eastern 727 at Kennedy International Airport in 1975. Defen-
dant claimed the protections of the Warsaw Convention.' 78
The court held that the transportation of plaintiff was "do-
mestic," even though an extension of the trip to Greece via
Olympic Airlines was contemplated, because he was ticketed
only between Baton Rouge and New York.7 9 The court con-
sidered the plaintiff's inability to read English in determining
the question of whether requisite notice was given, and thus
170 Id. at 533.
171 Id.
172 Id.
73 16 Av. Cas. 17,269 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981).
17 103 Mich. App. 566, 303 N.W.2d 238 (1981).
17 303 N.W.2d at 239.
170 Id. at 239-40.
17 512 F. Supp. 330, 331 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
178 512 F. Supp. at 330-31.
171 Id. at 334-35.
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whether the Convention was applicable.180 The court also in-
quired into the collateral estoppel effect of a prior adjudica-
tion against Eastern Air Lines by another Greek seaman,
plaintiff's shipmate on the ill-fated plane.' 8 The court held
that, though the decision in the first case was interlocutory in
nature, collateral estoppel still applied in Georgakis.83 Thus,
the holding in the first case, that the Greek seaman was not
adequately notified of Warsaw's limitations, was of "extreme
significance" to the plaintiff's case. 83
The defendant in Carriage Bags, Ltd. v. Aerolineas Argen-
tinas,184 sought to avoid liability for the full amount of dam-
ages claimed for a lost consignment of goods by asserting the
limitation of the Warsaw Convention. The waybill used by de-
fendant stated, on the obverse side, merely that the conven-
tion might be applicable and might limit liability, and then
referred the reader to the reverse of the form. 185 The court
held that the terms on the reverse, which clearly stated the
application of the Convention, were incorporated into the con-
tract only if defendant could show that the plaintiff, who had
not signed the terms on the reverse of the form in the signa-
ture blank provided, otherwise assented to the terms.'86 Since
the defendant failed show plaintiff's acquiescence, the court
held that the carrier would not be entitled to the protection of
the Warsaw Convention.18 7
In a fifteen line opinion, decided under the Warsaw Con-
vention, the Southern District of New York held a prism to
that treaty. The plaintiff, in Lautore v. United Airlines,
Inc.,'88 conceded that facts forming the basis of his complaint
did not constitute "an accident," within the meaning of Arti-
cle 17 of the Convention. In granting defendant's motion to
'" Id. at 333-34.
181 Id.
I82 d. at 334.
"s Id. at 335.
18 16 Av. Cas. 17,997 (D. Colo. 1981).
Id. at 17,997-98.
I8 ld. at 17,998.
.s7 Id. at 17,999-18,000.
1" 16 Av. Cas. at 17,944 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court noted
that, because the event happened on a flight from Ontario,
Canada, to Chicago, Illinois, the Warsaw Convention
applied.189
V. CASES UNDER THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
In Ross v. United States,190 a pilot and his young son were
killed in the crash of the pilot's light plane when it struck
electric power lines on the approach path of a runway during
an instrument landing system (ILS) approach."e The pilot
had changed his flight plan from VFR 192 to IFR"43 en route
and had asked the air traffic controller for the "decision
height." The controller responded instead by stating the
"minimum descent altitude" to be 418 feet."' Decision height
was actually applicable to the pilot's approach and not mini-
mum descent altitude.19 5 The altitude stated by the controller
was incorrect.196 The controller repeated the answer when the
pilot asked to have the minimum descent altitude con-
firmed.19 7 The actual, published minimum descent altitude
was 560 feet above mean sea level.1" The power lines stood at
elevation of 267.75 feet above mean sea level.19' The court
noted that had the pilot maintained even the incorrect mini-
mum descent altitude given him by the controller, he would
have avoided collision with the power lines.2 0 0 Nevertheless,
the court held that "the controller's report of the incorrect
16 Av. Cas. at 17,944.
10 640 F.2d 511, 515-16 (5th Cir. 1980).
" See 14 C.F.R. §8 97.1, 97.3 (1981) for discussion of ILS.
92 See 14 C.F.R. 88 91.105-.109 (1981) for a definition of UFR.
'3 See 14 C.F.R §§ 91.115-.129 (1981) for a definition of IFR.
1" 16 Av. Cas. at 517-18.
' Id. at 518. "Decision height" is defined as the altitude in feet above mean sea
level at which a decision must be made during an ILS approach either to land or to
discontinue the approach. Id. at 517 n.11. "Minimum descent altitude" is defined as
the lowest altitude in feet above mean sea level to which descent is authorized on
final approach on an ILS approach when no glide slope is provided. Id. at 513 n.1.
10 Id. at 517-18.
I" Id. at 517.
Id.
'Id.
200 Id. at 520.
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[minimum descent altitude] occurred at a critical time and
proximately contributed to the crash of the [pilot's] plane
and, therefore, constituted negligence." '20'
The court earlier concluded that, though the controller was
not required by the Terminal Air Traffic Control Manual to
state either decision height or minimum descent altitude, he
had assumed such a duty when he purported to advise the
pilot of correct information.20 2 By giving the incorrect mini-
mum descent altitude, the controller breached that duty.20
The pilot's representative was denied recovery, however, be-
cause of the pilot's contributory negligence, but the son of the
pilot, a passenger in the plane, was not bound by the contrib-
utory negligence of the pilot and did recover against the
United States214
In Selifors v. United States,105 the District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia ruled that the United States
could not be held liable for breach of the duty imposed by the
Airport and Airway Development Act to mitigate the hazard
to navigation caused by birds feeding near an airport runway.
The court had earlier opined that this omission on the part of
the United States was not a discretionary act.2 0 6 In addition,
the court in Selifors held that the air traffic controllers were
301 Id. at 519.
303 Id.
3 Id.
o4 Id. at 520-21.
20 16 Av. Cas. 17,186 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 30, 1980). Many feel this decision is an ill-
advised reversal of Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. United States, No. C74-24A, slip op. at
4 (N.D. Ga. March 25, 1975).
2" Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. United States, No. C74-24A, slip op. (N.D. Ga.
March 25, 1975). See Dalhite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953); Fair v. United
States, 234 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1956). Section 1718 of the Airport and Airway Develop-
ment Act of 1970 provides, in part:
(a) As a condition precedent to his approval of an airport development
project under this subchapter, the Secretary shall receive assurances in
writing, satisfactory to him that -
... the aerial approaches to the airport will be adequately cleared
and protected by removing, lowering, relocating, marking, or lighting
or otherwise mitigating existing airport hazards and by preventing the
establishment or creation of future airport hazards.
49 U.S.C. § 1718(3) (1976).
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not negligent in failing to warn of the birds' presence since
there was no evidence that the controllers were aware of
them.10 7
Plaintiff's position was that the Airport and Airway Devel-
opment Act created a duty on the part of the United States,
by requiring the Government to obtain assurances from oper-
ators receiving its grants, that adjoining land would not be
used for incompatible purposes. s08 The court held that more
than the existence of a duty is required under the Federal
Tort Claims Act (FTCA), since under the Act there is the fur-
ther requirement for prosecution that, under the same cir-
cumstances, a private person would also be liable under the
local law.'09 The court held that the plaintiff's position, that a
violation of the federal statute was negligence per se under
Georgia law, had not been established in Georgia? 0 It was
clear from the opinion that a private person could not become
liable under the Airport and Airway Development Act, thus
the requirement of the FTCA could not be fulfilled. 1
In Medina v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,1 the court stated that
federal jurisdiction rests on diversity of citizenship. It is not
permissible for the court to extend its jurisdiction to a person
whose citizenship is not diverse from that of the plantiff,
merely to adjudicate a state claim in the same action. 8 In
Medina, however, the jurisdiction of the district court was
207 Sellfors v. U.S., 16 Av. Cas. at 17,190.
108 Id. at 17,188.
log Id. at 17,188-89. Section 1346(b) of Title 28 of the United States Code provides,
in part, that federal district courts
shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the
United States, for money damages, accruing on and after January 1,
1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused
by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the
Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment,
under circumstances where the United States if a private person,
would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place
where the act or omission occurred.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976).
3 16 Av. Cas. at 17,189.
211 Id.
"1 502 F. Supp. 60 (D.P.R. 1980).
"18 Id. at 62.
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based on the Federal Torts Claims Act. 4 The court noted the
circuit court's previous holding that the pendent jurisdiction
could be exercised over non-diverse defendants where the
"anchor chain" to which the jurisdiction was made fast was a
federal one, and complete relief could only be had in a federal
court.2 5 The court then ruled that it was appropriate to ex-
tend its jurisdiction over the non-diverse defendant, stating
that federal jurisdiction over the tort claim is exclusive, and
noting that the "new," non-diverse defendant was not really a
new party, since it was the insurer of one of the defendants.'1
The court, in Foss v. United States,1 held that a private
pilot who was approaching an airport which had a published
pattern altitude of eight hundred feet mean sea level, and who
was flying at or near that altitude when he struck a 1890 foot
radio tower was not negligent as a matter of law.218 The court
reached its decision despite the pilot's seeming violation of
the general rule in 14 C.F.R. § 91.3 providing that the pilot in
command is directly responsible for the operation of the air-
craft, and the rule in 14 C.F.R. § 91.5 requiring the pilot to
familiarize himself with all available information concerning
his flight.219 The court agreed that the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration's (FAA) traffic pattern was negligently drafted
and that the trial court acted properly in accepting evidence
that haze and the sun's position at the time of the accident
could have adversely affected the pilot's vision." 0 By distin-
guishing this case from others in which the pilot had a duty to
know the limitations of the aircraft, or in which the pilot
failed to keep a proper lookout, the court seemed to absolve
the pilot of any error in failing to see the radio tower."21 The
appellate court concluded that the trial court had not applied
the wrong standard in judging the pilot's conduct, and there-
"' 502 F. Supp. at 63.
Id. at 62-63.
10 Id. at 63.
117 623 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1980).
"1' Id. at 106-107.
21" Id. at 106.
220 Id. at 107.
ni d.
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fore, affirmed the judgment below in favor of the pilot's
beneficiaries.2
In Thomas v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp.,228 an action arising
from the crash of a Lockheed C-5 "Galaxy" after departure
from Saigon during the evacuation of orphans and others, the
question of Lockheed's right to indemnification by the United
States was raised and answered in the negative. In Thomas,
the plaintiff's decedent was an employee of the United
States.2 2 When Lockheed impleaded the United States as a
third-party defendant, it alleged a right to indemnification on
a variety of common law and contract grounds. The United
States answered that, though it might have been amenable to
suit under the FTCA, if negligence of its servants in the oper-
ation and maintenance of the airplane had made Lockheed li-
able to the plaintiff, its obligation to indemnify Lockheed was
barred by the terms of the Federal Employees' Compensation
Act (FECA)22' which provides that the liability of the United
States to an employee under the act is exclusive of any other
statutory liability of the United States.22 6 Therefore, although
Lockheed was subject to tremendous liability, FECA limited
the United States' liability. The government's liability could
not be increased merely by bringing suit against a government
contractor and having the goverment contractor bring the
government in as a third-party defendant for purpose of in-
demnity.2 27 The court, in Thomas, described the indemnifica-
tion problem as one aspect of a larger controversy, but held
that the controversy was no longer alive because the FECA is
so clear on the question of the exclusiveness of its remedy.2
222 Id.
2' 665 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
I, ld. at 1331.
I' ld. at 1331-32. See Federal Employees' Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-
8151 (1976).
22 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c) (1976).
.. 665 F.2d at 1332.
2' Id. Lockheed argued that the FECA did not bar a contribution action brought
by a third party against the United States. The Thomas court answered that argu-
ment by citing Murray v. United States, 405 F.2d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1968), which explic-
itly held to the contrary. The only question the Thomas court found unanswered by
the Murray decision was whether an action for non-contractual indemnity, resting
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In Baird v. United States," plaintiff sought to prove the
United States liable to him for the negligence of its servant in
preparing a misleading sectional aeronautical chart. In Baird,
plaintiff relied on a chart showing lights available at a certain
airport and giving the length of the longest runway there, but
not indicating that the lights were not on the longest runway,
as plaintiff assumed. He overran the lighted runway, killing
two passengers and injuring two others.23 The court of ap-
peals affirmed the trial court's dismissal for want of subject
matter jurisdiction, holding that the decision of the Inter-
Agency Air Cartographic Committee of the United States to
publish data as it appeared on the sectional chart was "pre-
cisely the kind of discretionary judgment that Congress . . .
meant to shield from suit" when it enacted the FTCA.13'
In Carter v. City of Cheyenne,'3 ' the court of appeals held
that the defendant City of Cheyenne, sued by the representa-
tives of a member of the United States Air Force Thunder-
birds killed in the crash of his T-38 aircraft at Cheyenne Air-
port, could not bring a third-party action against the United
States for the negligence of the FAA in the operation of the
air traffic control system. The widow of the deceased pilot
sued Cheyenne for negligence in the construction, mainte-
nance, control and supervision of the airfield runway. Chey-
enne then filed a third-party action against the United States
alleging negligence of the FAA because it had given the pilot
incorrect data concerning the landing field conditions. The
court held that the only cause of action against the United
States available to the decedent's representative was under
the Veterans' Benefit Act because the decedent was on active
duty when he was killed.'3 3 Following the holdings in Feres v.
upon an independent duty running from the third-party defendant, the putative in-
demnitor, to the third-party plaintiff, would also be barred by FECA. 665 F.2d 1332-
33. The Thomas court held the claims of the third-party plaintiff, Lockheed, were all
derivative claims, based upon the negligence of servants to the original plaintiffs. Id.
at 1333.
m 653 F.2d 437, 438 (10th Cir. 1981).
230 653 F.2d at 438.
Id. at 440.
" 649 F.2d 827, 828-29 (10th Cir. 1981).
"' 649 F.2d at 830.
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United States, 8 4 and Stencel v. United States,'3 the court
determined that it would be inconsistent to deny the decedent
a cause of action against the United States under the FTCA,
yet permit the City of Cheyenne to bring such an action
against the United States.3'e
In Allegheny Airlines v. United States,23 7 the district court
held that the date of accrual for plaintiff's cause of action
against the United States was that on which the FAA made
its final administrative disposition of the claim, rather than
the date on which the accident occurred. Thus, the Pennsyl-
vania Comparative Negligence Act applied to the action since
its effective date was after the date of the accident, but before
the date of the administrative disposition.
VI. CASES CENTERING ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS COVERING
AVIATION LIABILITY
In Edmonds v. United States,' the First Circuit surveyed
the case of a pilot involved in an accident while operating an
airplane after the expiration of his biennial flight review, 89
who was then denied indemnification by his insurer on the
ground that a condition of the insurance policy was not ful-
filled at the time of the accident. The court affirmed the dis-
trict court's application of Massachusetts law under which it
was necessary to characterize the clause in the contract of in-
surance relating to the biennial flight review as either a condi-
tion precedent, in which case Avemco's (other insurer's) obli-
gation was terminated, or a warranty or representation, in
which case coverage could be avoided only if the breach con-
2" 340 U.S. 135 (1950) (holding that the United States is not liable under the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act for injuries to members of the armed forces sustained while on
active duty and not on furlough, and resulting from the negligence of others in the
armed forces).
138 431 U.S. 666 (1977). In Stencel, the serviceman sued the manufacturer of the
aircraft ejection system; the manufacturer unsuccessfully cross-claimed against the
United States government for indemnity based on faulty specifications.
:36 649 F.2d at 828-29.
37 16 Av. Cas. 17,738, 17,739 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
'S 642 F.2d 877 (1st Cir. 1981).
'89 A biennial flight review is required by current federal aviation regulations. It is
administered by a certified flight instructor. 14 C.F.R. § 61.57 (1981).
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tributed to the accident or increased the insurer's risk of
loss. 40 In addition, the court of appeals supported the lower
court's view that, under Charles, Henry and Crowley, Co. v.
The Home Insurance Co.,241 the clause in question should be
characterized as a condition precedent because: (1) the state-
ment of the insured related to the insurer's knowing decision
to issue the policy; and (2) the statement was made a condi-
tion precedent to recovery under the policy, either by using
those words or their equivalent.' 42
On appeal, the plaintiff contended that a later Massachu-
setts decision, Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Bowes,' 4 established
the rule that a breach of condition in an insurance policy al-
lows avoidance of coverage only when the insurer shows that
such breach increased the risk of loss or contributed to the
accident. The court, however, rejected the application of
Johnson Controls to the case on the ground that the contract
clause in Johnson Controls required notification by the in-
sured of the filing of a malpractice suit against the insured, a
provision which the court found had no bearing on insurabil-
ity, but instead was intended to protect the insurer's intersts
after a claim arose.24' Finally, the court held that whether the
contract clause in the case did constitute a condition prece-
dent was a question of law, a holding which at first glance
appears to be the product of circular reasoning, but which in
fact is founded on the language in Charles, Henry & Crowley
Co., requiring the terms "condition precedent" or "their
equivalent.' '241
The court in Edmonds v. United States, ignored, or was not
invited to consider, the existence of a condition precedent in
the form of the pilot's passage of a biennial flight review. Had
the condition been considered, it might have appeared imma-
340 642 F.2d at 881-82.
"' 349 Mass. 723, 726, 212 N.E.2d 240, 241-42 (1965) (action on "Jewelers' Black
Policy.").
642 F.2d at 882.
1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1831, 409 N.E.2d 185 (1980).
642 F.2d at 881-82.
I4 ld. at 882.
Id. at 883.
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terial in the formation of the contract. There is no doubt that
the clause was a condition precedent, but when the nature of
the biennial flight review is considered, and the ease with
which it is passed is noted, it can be appreciated that the con-
dition precedent may not go to the heart of the insurance con-
tract. That being the case, the court could have excused the
condition precedent because forfeiture would follow its en-
forcement. The court could have construed the clause as a
covenant, for the breach of which damages, could, if proved,
be recovered.
The problem remaining for a court construing a clause in
the above manner would be the difficulty of determining the
purpose of such an immaterial condition precedent. The pur-
pose seems to be the maximizing of effort to avoid accidents,
the same purpose served by the institution of the biennial
flight review by the FAA. In any event, it is apparent that the
aim of the clause is not one of the preventing liability on the
contract of insurance, although that is the result of this
decision.
In United States Fire Insurance Co. v. Pruess2"7 the court
held that, in a policy of liability insurance issued to a fixed
,base operator, the clause which excluded indemnification for
harm to any "person operating the aircraft under the terms of
any rental agreement or training program which provides any
remuneration to the named insured for the use of said air-
craft" did not exclude indemnification to a designated airman
examiner, injured while flying with a student pilot/renter of
the airplane.4 8 In U.S. Fire Insurance, the examiner was ac-
tually flying the airplane when the accident occurred.2 '" The
court seemed to attach significance to the expression "renter
pilot" as used in the phrase "renter pilot exclusion." The
court suggested that the parties both agreed to the correct
characterization of the clause.150 The question remains as to
the conclusion the court would reach if a renter pilot briefly
117 394 So. 2d 469 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
148 Id. at 469-70.
:,9 Id. at 469.
"5 Id. at 470.
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turned over the controls to another pilot who was not the
renter, since that pilot would not fall into the characterization
of "renter pilot."
The Texas Court of Civil Appeals in Cabell v. World Ser-
vice Life Insurance Co., 25 1 held that plaintiff's decedent, who
jumped from an airplane in a maneuverable sport parachute,
known as a para-plane, was not covered by the policy, which
provided general coverage but which limited such coverage to
those riding as passengers "in any previously tried, tested and
approved aircraft. ' '1"2  The decedent was killed when, to avoid
power lines, he turned his parachute sharply, resulting in a
stall and causing his fall to the ground.2 5 The court con-
cluded from these facts that the decedent was not riding in a
tried, tested and approved aircraft at the time of his death.2"
The court did affirm that, at his death, the decedent was in a
"vehicle or device for aerial navigation," described in the
terms of an exclusion clause in the policy.2 5
In Bayers v. Omni Aviation Managers, Inc.,'" the district
court held that, though the insured pilot did not have a valid
medical certificate at the time of the accident, the policy of
insurance issued by the defendant still applied because there
was no causal connection between the accident and the in-
sured pilot's failure to have a valid medical certificate.2 7 The
court stated that the insurer could have provided for such a
case in the policy exclusions, and that the failure to do so was
indicative of an intention to omit such a case from the exclu-
sions."" The court pointed out that unfairness would result
from a refusal to enforce the policy in such circumstances."'
Graves v. Charter National Insurance Company,'0 was an
action in which the named insured added an additional
599 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
"' Id. at 652-53.
"' Id.
"4 Id. at 653-54.
"' Id. at 654.
510 F. Supp. 1204 (D. Mont. 1981).
,o Id. at 1207.
"' Id. at 1206-1207.
,' Id. at 1207.
26 15 Av. Cas. 18,210 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
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named insured to the policy, resulting in a loss of coverage for
himself. The insured, Kelley, was sued by Graves who was in-
jured while starting Kelley's airplane. Kelley demanded that
the insurer, Charter, defend him, while Charter brought a de-
claratory judgment action against both Kelley and Graves, as-
serting that it had no duty to defend Kelley because Graves
was a named insured specifically excluded under Kelley's pol-
icy, and was not, therefore, entitled to coverage.
Under the policy, Kelley and "Graves Aircraft Sales and
Rental" were named insureds. Graves asserted that the exclu-
sion of his company, later a partnership, did not exclude him
personally, and that since he was not notified of his status as
named insured, he could not be denied coverage.2 61 The court
held that the terms of the policy bound, despite Grave's lack
of notice of his being named an insured. The court added that
the name "Graves Aircraft Sales and Rental" was an assumed
name applicable to Graves personally, which named him as an
insured regardless of the legal character of his business.
The court in Di Santo v. Enstrom Helicopter Corp.26' held
the terms of a policy to be applicable despite the nature of
binders as interim contracts of insurance. In Di Santo the
court held that new consideration was not needed to support
the addition of a pilot's qualification clause to an insurance
contract which began as a binder between the insurance com-
pany and the insured, because the parties left open the pilot
qualification term when the binder was issued.2 s After re-
viewing the correspondence between the parties, the court
concluded that, when the binder was signed, both parties con-
templated that the details of the insurance policy would be
finalized later.264 The court also held that there was no need
to establish a causal connection between the pilot's failure to
Il ld. at 18,211.
' 489 F. Supp. 1352 (E.D. Pa. 1980). The term "binder" is used in insurance prac-
tice to refer to a document memorializing a temporary contract of insurance pending
action by the insurer on an application. See R. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE
LAW, 36-37 (1971); 12 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 7221 (1943 &
Supp. 1979).
"3 489 F. Supp. 1352, 1358 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
I d. at 1357.
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satisfy the terms of the policy and the accident which oc-
curred while he was piloting the craft.26 While noting the
split in authority in other jurisdictions, the court stressed
that, in the instant case, the policy terms did not require a
causal link between the pilot qualifications and the accident
in order to render the exclusion applicable.2" The court found
that prefacing the applicability of an insurance exclusion
clause with the requirement that the subject of the exclusion
be causally related to the loss would amount to judicial modi-
fication of the contract.27
Another case involving a dispute over the effect of the fail-
ure to satisfy requirements of a pilot's qualification clause is
Goddard v. Avemco Insurance Company.2 6 In Goddard, the
Court of Appeals of Oregon held that the insurer was not es-
topped to deny coverage under a policy excluding coverage for
an accident involving a pilot without a valid medical certifi-
cate, even though the policy was issued by the company with
knowledge that the insured did not have a medical certifi-
cate.26 ' The court observed that, to effect an estoppel, there
must be a representation by someone acting on behalf of the
insurance company which is inconsistent with the expressed
terms of the policy and which is relied upon by the insured.7
Finding no such representation, the court concluded that the
renewal of the insured's policy was not tantamount to a repre-
sentation that the unambiguous medical certificate require-
ment in the policy was inapplicable.2 1
The court in Underwriters at Interest v. Bill Hames Shows,
Inc., 72 concluded that an aircraft involved in a crash was not
covered by the policy of insurance due to an unauthorized
:65 Id. at 1364.
26 Id. The court observed that the overwhelming majority of courts hold that an
insurance exclusion is effective whether or not there is any causal connection between
the excluded risk and the loss. Id.
207 Id.
43 Or. App. 39, 602 P.2d 291 (1979).
," 602 P.2d at 294.
170 Id. at 294.
171 Id.
27. 642 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1981).
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modification of the aircraft's rudder control system.27 The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the addition
of a device permitting hand control of the aircraft's rudder
invalidated the aircraft's FAA airworthiness certificate which
was a prerequisite for coverage under the insured's policy.' 7'
As in Di Santo and Goddard, the court held that noncompli-
ance with unambiguous insurance policy provisions suspended
coverage, regardless of whether a causal connection existed
between the noncompliance and the loss or injury.27 5
A current FAA airworthiness certificate was also a prerequi-
site to coverage under the insurance policy in Ochs v. Avemco
Insurance Co.276 In Ochs the defendant insurer denied liabil-
ity on its policy because the airplane's standard airworthiness
certificate was not valid when the accident occurred.2 7 Again,
as in Underwriters at Interest, the court rejected the plain-
tiff's argument that there must be causal connection between
the accident and the unfulfilled condition of the policy before
the condition takes effect.278 After stating that an insurer may
exclude any liability from coverage, provided doing so is not
against public policy, the Oregon Court of Appeals denied
coverage and held that proof of a causal connection between
the cause of the accident and the policy exclusion is not re-
quired for an insurer to avoid payment.
An unusual indemnification issue was addressed by the
Court of Appeals of Maryland in Bankers and Shippers In-
surance Company v. Electro Enterprises, Inc.'5 In this case,
the insurance company brought an action for a declaratory
judgment that its insurance policy did not provide coverage
for, or obligate the company to defend, claims resulting from
" Id. at 180.
74Id.
Id.
171 80 Or. App. 768, 636 P.2d 421 (1981).
"7 636 P.2d at 422. Coverage C of the policy excluded "any aircraft, while in flight
(1) not bearing a valid and currently effective 'standard' Airworthiness Category Cer-
tificate issued by the Federal Aviation Agency." Id.
278 Id. at 423.
'" Id. at 424.
287 Md. 641, 415 A.2d 278 (1980).
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an accident involving its insured's aircraft.2 s" The insured and
all of the representatives of persons killed in the accident
were named as defendants. 2 The Circuit Court for Washing-
ton County held that the insurance company was liable to de-
fend the insured under the terms of the policy.283
Thereafter, the insured and the decedent's representatives
sought to recover expenses incurred while defending them-
selves in the insurance company's declaratory judgment ac-
tion.28 Curiously, the Circuit Court for Washington County
found that all the defendants in the declaratory judgment ac-
tion were entitled to receive attorney's fees and expenses in-
curred while defending the prior suit, even though some of
these claims were not based on contractual obligations owed
them by the insurance company.' 8 The Court of Appeals of
Maryland reversed the lower court's decision and held that
only those defendants to whom the insurance company was
contractually obligated were entitled to indemnification for
attorney's fees and expenses incurred while defending them-
selves in the declaratory judgment action. 6 The court based
its decision on a finding that the only expenses the insurance
company had agreed to reimburse under the provisions of the
insurance policy were those related to a claim filed against an
insured for which the insured might become liable. 87 Al-
though the court found that the plaintiffs in the original tort
action could arguably be within 'the literal definition of "in-
sured,' 88 it ruled them to be precluded from recovering attor-
ney's fees and expenses incurred in the defense of the declara-
tory judgment action because there was nothing in the record
that indicated they might become liable for tort claims arising
181 415 A.2d at 280.
181 Id.
Ua Id. at 281.
284 Id.
188 Id. at 282-83.
18I Id. at 283.
187 Id.
188 Id. The term "insured" as used in the policy at issue was defined to include
"not only the Named Insured but also any person while using or riding in the air-
craft .. " Id.
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out of the crash.2
The court in Morgan v. Continental Casualty Co. 290 con-
strued a group life insurance policy as it applied in an avia-
tion accident case. In Morgan, the Third District Court of Ap-
peals of Florida held that no insurance coverage was afforded
for the death of plaintiff's decedent, an airline pilot, under a
group policy issued by defendant to decedent's employer,
Delta Airlines.2 91 Decedent was killed in the crash of a private




The insurance provided by the Policy shall apply while the
Insured Employee or a Dependent covered hereunder is riding
as a passenger in any aircraft properly licensed to carry passen-
gers and while an Insured Employee is operating or performing
duties as a crew member of any aircraft owned, leased or oper-
ated by Delta, including ferry flights, except that no coverage
shall apply while such aircraft is being used for training or





This Policy does not cover any loss, fatal or non-fatal, caused
by or resulting from:
(5) riding in any aircraft, except to the extent permitted, and
specifically described in Part H, 'Air Coverage'."'
Against the claim of plaintiff's decedent that the term "rid-
ing as a passenger in any aircraft" was ambiguous, and in the
face of the further argument that there was no exclusion for
"passengers," the court held that the coverage provisions were
unambiguous and did not provide coverage for the dece-
3,, Id.
'" 382 So. 2d 351 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
I~ d. at 352.
" Id.
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dent.2 9s The court found that the term 'passenger' did not in-
clude a 'pilot' within the policy coverage."
After noting that the plaintiff's decedent was the only li-
censed pilot aboard the plane when it crashed, the court
adopted the position of the defendant, stating that "it is the
status throughout the journey that determines whether one is
a 'pilot' or a 'passenger'. ' '2 95 As additional support for this
conclusion, the court cited the Federal Aviation Regulations,
specifically 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 and § 91.3, which establishes that a
pilot is not a passenger and does not lose his status as such if
he undertakes some momentary task other than actual opera-
tion of the aircraft.29 6 Therefore, the court concluded that the
decedent was not a passenger when the plane crashed.297
In Vanguard Insurance Co. v. Stewart,298 the court was
faced with the issue of whether "flying time" was sufficient to
afford coverage under an insurance policy which expressly re-
quired "log time." This controversy arose out of the crash of a
Cessna 180 aircraft owned by Stewart, the named insured.2
Evidence presented at trial showed that Gerald Greak was the
pilot in command at the time of the crash.300
The defendant's policy covered the medical expenses of any
airplane occupant, as well as any physical damage to the air-
craft.30 1 The policy, however, provided that the insurance was
effective only after the aircraft's operator logged at least ten
hours in a Cessna 180 aircraft, and possessed a current and
valid pilot certificate with appropriate ratings, as well as a
current medical certificate.302 Neither Stewart nor Greak, who
was a passenger at the time of the crash, had logged the re-
quired ten hours in a Cessna 180 aircraft.303 Additionally,
293 Id.
194 Id.
"' Id. at 352-53.
S" Id.
297 Id. at 353.
593 S.W.2d 736 (Tex. Civ. App. - Houston 1979), afl'd, 603 S.W.2d 761 (1980).




30 Id. at 738.
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Stewart did not have a current medical certificate.804
The trial court rendered a judgment in favor of the insured
after finding that Greak had satisfied the requirements of cov-
erage in the policy provisions.30 5 The Texas Court of Appeals,
however, disagreed and reversed,3 ' 6 finding that the jury's de-
termination that Greak had logged ten hours in a Cessna 180
aircraft was without support in the evidence.0 7 This finding
was based on the court's determination that "flying time" was
insufficient to satisfy coverage provisions where the policy ex-
pressly requires "log time."30 8 To show that the plane was
covered by the policy at the time of the accident, evidence was
required that Greak had logged ten hours as pilot in com-
mand of a Cessna 180 either in his own log book or in a stu-
dent's log book, certified by him as correct.30' Because there
was no demonstrative evidence that the pilot had logged the
required ten hours at the time of the crash, the judgment for
the Stewarts was reversed. 10
VII. CASES ON A VARIETY OF PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS
In Obenshain v. Halliday,"' a wrongful death action arising
from the death of Congressman Richard D. Obenshain in an
airplane crash, the United States was made a defendant on
the theory that it was liable under the Federal Aviation Act.3"'
The plaintiff alleged that the government failed to notify the
pilots that the runway lights were out of service.313 The air-
port operator, a co-defendant, was a resident of the same state
as the plaintiff.31' The plaintiff argued that the district court
had federal question jurisdiction because the violation of the
:04 Id.
305 Id. at 737.
3" Id. at 739.
307 Id.
l8 Id. (citing Marson Coal Co. v. Insurance Co., Pennsylvannia, 201 S.E.2d 747 (W.
Va. 1974)).
300 593 S.W.2d at 738-39.
310 Id.





FAA regulations regarding runway light maintenance and as-
sociated pilot notification was a violation of a federal law.31 6
The court held that, under the standards of Cort v. Ash,"' a
United States Supreme Court decision, no cause of action
arose from the violation of federal aviation regulations be-
cause no legislative intention to create a private cause of ac-
tion for breach of these regulations existed.3 1 7 The court's rul-
ing was based partially on the fact that Congress had recently
rejected a proposal creating a federal private action in such
cases, and partially on a finding that there was no need for a
federal action because available actions were adequate to meet
the needs of plaintiffs.3 18 While noting that the plaintiff's de-
cedent was a member of the class protected by the federal reg-
ulations, the court found that inference of a private action
was not "consistent with the underlying purposes of the legis-
lative scheme." '19
Next the court observed that it did not have federal ques-
tion jurisdiction or diversity jurisdiction over the county be-
cause the plaintiff did not have a cause of action under the
Federal Aviation Act, nor was there diversity of citizenship
between the plaintiff and the county.32 0 The court, however,
concluded that, under the doctrine of pendent party jurisdic-
tion, it was "both permissible and desirable to retain the
county as a party defendant."3 '' Relying on standards enunci-
ated by the Supreme Court in United Mine Workers of
America v. Gibbs,32 2 and Aldinger v. Howard,3 2 the court
found that there must be a " 'common nucleus of operative
fact' between claims against the United States of America and
the county,"3 24 that there must be subject matter jurisdiction
315 Id.
014 442 U.S. 66 (1975).
037 504 F. Supp. 946, 950 (E.D. Va. 1980). See [19581 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
3741.
", 504 F. Supp. 946, 950 (E.D. Va. 1980).
Id. at 950-51.
:00 Id. at 951.
81 Id.
: 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
23 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
", 504 F. Supp. 946, 951 (E.D. Va. 1980).
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under the Federal Tort Claims Act, and that the Constitution
must allow such jurisdiction in the case of a party over whom
there is no independent federal jurisdiction2 5 The court ob-
served that the application of state law could not be avoided
by dismissing the action against the non-federal party, be-
cause state law applied to claims brought under the Federal
Tort Claims Act. 26 The court also noted that Congress im-
plicitly acknowledged the possibility of joinder of other ac-
tions when it created the Federal Tort Claims Act.83 7
The plaintiff's claim to third party beneficiary status under
the Airport Development Program contract between the
County and the Federal Aviation Administration was dis-
missed by the court. Us The court reasoned that the plaintiff's
standing to sue as a third party beneficiary was determined by
Virginia laws. se The court found that Virginia laws required
the person claiming such status to show that the agreement
was clearly intended to bestow a direct benefit on him.33 0 Be-
cause the contract did not contain language that demon-
strated a clear and definite intent to benefit the plaintiff, the
court dismissed this count of plaintiff's complaint against the
county.331
Similarly, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York in Griner v. Dugan,s3 3 held that a plain-
tiff, assaulted while waiting at defendant's baggage carousel,
had not stated a federal cause of action based upon the car-
rier's violation of federal aviation regulations, 14 C.F.R.
H Id.
Id.
SSI Id. at 952.
3S8 Id. at 956. The plaintiff's claim to third party beneficiary status was based on
language in the contract that provided that the county would "operate the airport as
such for the use and benefit of the public." Id. n.6.
Id. at 956.
30 Id. See VA. CoDn § 55-22 (1974).
321 504 F. Supp. 946, 956-57 (E.D. Va. 1980). The court observed that the Virginia
Supreme Court would probably adopt the rationale of the Georgia Supreme Court in
Miree v. United States, 242 Ga. 126, 249 S.E.2d 573, 579 (1979), that exposure of a
county to liability would be too broad if every injured party was allowed to claim
third party beneficiary status under a public contract. Id.
" 16 Av. Cas. 17,842 (S.D.N.Y 1981).
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121.575. s"' The plaintiff claimed $1,000,000 in damages for an
alleged assault by a fellow passenger who had lunged at her
and attempted to touch her "in an intimate manner.","4 The
plaintiff claimed that she was entitled to the protection of the
FAA regulations because American Airlines had served the
passenger, who appeared to be intoxicated, alcoholic bever-
ages during the flight.333 After applying the test announced by
the Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash"' for determining whether
a plaintiff has an implied private cause of action for violation
of a federal regulation, the court determined that, once the
plane on which plaintiff and her attacker had traveled and on
which the attacker was alleged to have been sold alcoholic
beverages had landed, plaintiff was no longer a member of the
class intended to be protected by the regulation. 3 7 The court
also found that there was no special legislative intent to grant
a private right of action and that there was a remedy available
to the plaintiff under state law.338 Thus, the court concluded
that there was no need to imply a federal remedy.33'
In Harrod v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, Inc.,40 the plain-
tiff, who lived outside of marriage with Paula Blake, a victim
of the 1978 mid-air collision at Lindbergh Field, San Diego,
.3 14 C.F.R. § 121.575 (1981) provides in relevant part that:
(a) No person may drink any alcoholic beverage aboard an aircraft un-
less the certificate holder operating the aircraft has served that bever-
age to him.
(b) No certificate holder may serve any alcoholic beverage to any per-
son aboard any aircraft who-
(1) Appears to be intoxicated.
33 16 Av. Cas. 17,842 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
Id.
330 422 U.S. 664 (1975). The Supreme Court stated that the following questions
must be answered affirmatively before a court will imply a private cause of action for
violation of a federal regulation. (1) Is the plaintiff a member of the class the statute
was enacted to protect? (2) Is there either explicit, or implicit, evidence of a legisla-
tive intent to create such a remedy or to deny one? (3) Is it consistent with the un-
derlying purpose of the regulation to imply a remedy for the plaintiff?. (4) Is "the
cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the con-
cern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based
solely on federal law?" Id.
131 16 Av. Cas. 17,842-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
318 Id. at 17,844.
I-1 Id. at 17,845.
118 Cal. App. 3d 155, 173 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1981).
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brought an action for her death under the California wrongful
death statute. The California Court of Appeals upheld the
trial court's denial of recovery under the statute despite the
fact that the relationship had every earmark of marriage, in-
cluding pooling of earnings, joint purchase of real property,
and an agreement to share property accumulated during their
relationship.8 41 The court found the "meretricious spouse of a
decedent is not an heir who may bring an action for wrongful
death" under the statute.34'2 The decision was based on the
court's observations that the legislature is responsible for
identifying who is entitled to sue for wrongful death, and that
exclusion of meretricious spouses from the class of people
which may sue for wrongful death did not deny meretricious
spouses equal protection of the laws.
48
In Jim Fox Enterprises, Inc. v. Air France,844 the court ad-
dressed the issue of whether the Texas long-arm statute 5 re-
quires that a cause of action arise out of the defendant's con-
tacts with the state. The Texas statute makes "the act or acts
of engaging in such business within this State" ' the
equivalent of the appointment of the Secretary of State as
agent "upon whom service of process may be made in any ac-
tion, suit or proceedings arising out of such business done in
this State. . . .", The court noted that, in the 1977 case of
U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt,84 8 the Texas Supreme
Court stated that Texas courts would not be required to ex-
amine minutely the character of the defendant's activities
within the state to determine whether the activities were
41 Id. at 157-58, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 69.
"s Id. at 157, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 69 (citing Aspinall v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 625
F.2d 325, 327 (9th Cir. 1980)).
848 118 Cal. App. 3d at 157-58, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 69. The court found that the exclu-
sion of meretricious spouses protected a variety of state interests such as deterring
fraudulent claims and promoting marriage. Thus, the exclusion was a reasonable limi-
tation on the right to recover for wrongful death. Id.
34, 16 Av. Cas. 17,661 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
46 TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (Vernon's Supp. 1980).
34 16 Av. Cas. 17,661, 17,662 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (quoting Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann.
art. 2031b § 3 (Vernon's Supp. 1980)).
847 Id.
$4 553 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978).
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within the scope of the long-arm statute s 'e In U-Anchor, the
court held that, with respect to what acts constitute "doing
business," the Texas long-arm statute is limited only by fed-
eral constitutional requirements of due process.850
In Jim Fox, however, the question was not whether the de-
fendant was doing business within the state, but whether the
action arose out of the airline's contacts with the state.11 The
court observed that federal district courts were not in agree-
ment on whether the Texas long-arm statute requires the
cause of action to arise out of the defendant's contacts with
Texas.8"' The court also noted that the Fifth Circuit had
treated this factor as a separate prerequisite to application of
the long-arm statute.358 Based on this observation, the court
reasoned that the Texas statute did not authorize suit in the
instant case because the cause of action did not arise out of
the defendant's contacts with the state.8" Therefore, the de-
fendant's motion to dismiss the suit was granted.88
In Donahue v. Far Eastern Air Transport Corp.,8 " the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held assertion
of personal jurisdiction over a Taiwanese company to be in-
compatible with due process. The court determined that to re-
quire Far Eastern, a company lacking any substantial base
within the United States, to respond in the United States for
the death of United States citizens killed on an intra-island
flight in Taiwan, the tickets for which were purchased in Tai-
8" 16 Av. Cas. 17,661, 17,662 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
"oId.
I' ld. at 17,663.
"2 Id. See Ayers v. Copperweld Corp., 487 F. Supp. 593 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (holding
that the cause of action did not arise out of contacts even indirectly and therefore
there was no basis for in personam jurisdiction) and Guiterrez v. Raymond Int'l, Inc.,
484 F. Supp. 241 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (holding that to establish jurisdiction over non-
resident corporation under Texas long-arm statute contract provision, it is necessary
that there be a connection between the contract and the cause of action). Cf Navarro
v. Sedco, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 1355 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (holding that a cause of action need
not arise directly out of defendant's contacts with Texas).
"3 16 Av. Cas. 17,661, 17,663 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
"Id.
Id. at 17,644.
652 F.2d 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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wan, would offend traditional notions of due process." ' The
only contacts Far Eastern had with the United States were
three California connections. "  Far Eastern paid for
purchases from American companies with funds on deposit in
a California bank, it applied to the Civil Aeronautics Board to
initiate a Taipei-Los Angeles cargo charter service, and it ne-
gotiated with United Airlines to purchase two of United's air-
planes.M The court concluded that these connections were in-
sufficient to support assertion of personal jurisdiction over Far
Eastern, and granted Far Eastern's motion to dismiss the ac-
tions instituted against it in federal courts. 6
In Aycock v. Louisiana Aircraft, Inc.,6 ' the Fifth Circuit
held that doing business of a "systematic nature" in Missis-
sippi was sufficient to bring the Louisiana defendant within
the scope of the Mississippi long-arm statute."2 The court so
held despite the fact that there was no direct link between the
cause of action and the defendant's business activity in Mis-
sissippi. s Because plaintiff's cause of action was incidental to
the defendant's business activity in Mississippi, the court con-
cluded that assertion of jurisdiction over the defendant would
not offend notions of fairness or substantial justice."4
In Sugarman v. Aeromexico, Inc.,315 the plaintiff brought an
action against Aeromexico for wrongs allegedly suffered by
him in the Acapulco airport while awaiting a delayed Aer-
omexico flight to New York City.3" The United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of New Jersey rendered summary
judgment for the airline after concluding that the airline's
public status precluded a court in the United States from ex-
... Id. at 1039.
.. Id. at 1034.
." Id. at 1034-35.
360 Id. at 1039.
36, 617 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1980).
Id, at 434 (construing Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-3-57 (1972)).
361 Id, at 435.
36, Id. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
3:6 626 F.2d 270 (3d. Cir. 1980).
366 Id. at 271. The plaintiff alleged that he had to wait for fifteen hours under
extremely brutal conditions causing him "physical pain and mental anguish," injury
to his health, and loss of time and wages. Id.
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ercising subject matter jurisdiction over the airline."' The
Third Circuit reversed the lower court and held that a wholly
owned corporate subsidiary of the sovereign State of Mexico
was not immune from the jurisdiction of the United States
courts.36 8 The court found that the corporation was subject to
jurisdiction because section 1605(a)(2) of the Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act provides that such state-owned commer-
cial entities are subject to the jurisdiction of American courts,
notwithstanding the immunity of their sovereign, if "the ac-
tion isr based upon a commercial activity carried on in the
United States by the foreign state or upon an act performed
in the United States in connection with a commercial activity
of the foreign state elsewhere. ... 369 In support of its con-
clusion, the court noted that the legislative history of the Act
indicated that foreign state immunity was intended to be lim-
ited to suits involving a foreign state's public acts and was not
intended to apply to suits based on a foreign state's private or
commercial acts.3 70
In Re Disaster at Riyadh Airport, Saudi Arabia, on August
19, 1980,871 was brought by representatives of persons who
died from inhalation of poisonous gases produced by a fire
aboard a Saudi Arabian Airlines Corporation plane. The ac-
tion was brought in the District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia under section 1605(a)(27) of the Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act. 87 2 The court rejected the plaintiff's argument
that the case fell within section 1605(a)(2), after concluding
that the airline's negligence did not produce a direct effect in
the United States. 73 Contrary to the position taken by the
Third Circuit in Sugarman, the court found that the commer-
cial activities of the Saudi Arabian Airlines in the United
States were insufficient to permit the plaintiffs to assert juris-
"7 Id. at 272.
Id. at 275.
369 Id. at 272-73.
17: Id. at 275. See H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 5, reprinted in [1976J
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6605, 6606.
371 16 Av. Cas. 17,880 (D.D.C. 1981).
.7. Id. 28 U.S.C. § 1602-11 (1976).
171 16 Av. Cas. 17,880, 17,881 (D.D.C. 1981).
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diction over the airline under the section 1605(a)(2) exception
to sovereign immunity. '7 The court stated that when a claim
arises out of a sovereign's activities conducted outside the
United States, the section 1605(a)(2) exception to sovereign
immunity is applicable only if the activity has a direct effect
in the United States.875
In Tokio Marine and Fire Insurance Co. v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York rendered summary judgment
for McDonnell Douglas in an action brought by Tokio Marine,
Japan Air Line's (JAL) insurer, for property damage, contri-
bution and indemnity claims arising out of a 1972 crash of a
McDonnell Douglas DC-8 during take-off from Moscow,
U.S.S.R.3 77 The court also rendered summary judgment in
favor of JAL and Tokio Marine on McDonnell Douglas' coun-
terclaim for contribution and indemnification . 78 The trial
court's decision was affirmed by the Second Circuit.37 9
On appeal, Tokio Marine asserted that California law pro-
hibits a manufacturer from disclaiming strict tort liability,
and that it was therefore entitled to recover from McDonnell
for the value of the plane.380 The Second Circuit found that
the terms of McDonnell Douglas' sales warranty precluded re-
covery by Tokio Marine because the warranty expressly pro-
vided that JAL, as purchaser, waived "all liabilities . . . aris-
ing by law or otherwise . ..whether or not caused by the
seller's negligence."3'' The court concluded that equal bar-
gainers, such as McDonnell and JAL, may disclaim strict tort
liability. " On appeal, the Second Circuit also determined
that the district court had correctly rejected McDonnell
Douglas' claim for indemnity and contribution on the grounds
37, Id. at 17,882. The airline had four offices in the United States and conducted
business in Missouri, Texas, California and New York. Id.
Il Id. at 17,881.
a70 617 F.2d 936 (2nd Cir. 1980).
377 Id. at 938.
38 Id.
379 Id.
.. Id. at 939.
31 Id. at 940.
86' Id. at 941.
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that a concurrent tortfeasor, such as JAL, who in good faith
has discharged an obligation resulting from the tort, is ab-
solved from any claim of indemnification by another, concur-
rent tortfeasor 3 83 McDonnell Douglas sought to avoid the ef-
fect of this rule by showing that the claims settled by JAL
were created by the Warsaw Convention and were contractual
rather than tortious in nature.84 The court acknowledged
that, in the Second Circuit, the Warsaw Convention is seen as
creating a cause of action but suggested that since it was un-
clear whether a claim under the Convention is in contract or
tort, and since the plaitiffs had alleged actions in tort as well
as under the non-exclusive Warsaw Convention, the actions
settled by JAL were settled by a concurrent tortfeasor 8'
Representatives of refugee children killed in the tragic crash
of a C-5 "Galaxy" in Viet Nam, during the American evacua-
tion, sued the aircraft manufacturer in Friends For All Chil-
dren, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp.3 86 The plaintiffs sought
a ruling in limine38 7 to prevent the manufacturer from reliti-
gating certain issues that had been decided in previous cases
arising out of the same crash. 88 The court treated the request
as a motion for summary judgment, and granted it, noting
that the law of the District of Columbia permits the use of the
doctrine of offensive collateral estoppel.389
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia reversed the trial court decision after finding that there
was not a "substantial identity of issues" among the prior
cases and the instant case. 90 Although the plaintiffs shared
the identical experience, the witnesses were the same, and
Lockheed had vigorously defended itself in the prior actions,
"3 Id. at 942.
884 Id.
85 Id.
88 497 F. Supp. 313 (D.D.C. 1980), rev'd sub nom., Schneider v. Lockheed Aircraft
Corp., 658 F.2d 835 (D.C.C. 1981).
88 A ruling in limine is a written motion presented before or after the commence-
ment of a jury trial seeking a protective order against prejudicial questions and state-
ments. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979).
"1 497 F. Supp. at 314.
"9 Id. at 316-17.
880 658 F.2d at 852.
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the court determined that Lockheed could not be collaterally
estopped from denying that the accident caused the injuries
alleged by the plaintiffA91 Reasoning that the likelihood that
the accident caused the injuries alleged would vary from case
to case, the court concluded that Lockheed would be denied
its day in court if it were not permitted to adjudicate the cau-
sation issue in each case.2
In Sterman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 9' the Second
Circuit held that alleged fraudulent misrepresentation in the
sale of a package tour did not create a federal cause of action
in violation of the terms of the Federal Aviation Act section
404(b). 94 That section prohibits carriers from subjecting any
person to any "unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage. '3 95
The plaintiffs claimed that, although Trans World Airlines
(TWA) promised them hotel accomodations at substantial
savings, they were charged rates above that normally charged
for the accommodations they received. 96 After determining
that the terms "unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage" were
not meant to turn the statute into a general prohibition
against deceptive trade practices, the court concluded that the
acts complained of did not fall within the scope of the
statute.""7
In Federal Insurance Co. v. United States,3" the plaintiff
insurance company was a subrogee of the victim of the negli-
gence by the United States which failed to properly maintain
a landing strip. The federal government was responsible for
not closing the strip when its use became dangerous. 99 The
fatal accident occurred when the pilot unsuccessfully at-
tempted to land his plane on the strip which was muddy and
39 Id.
392 Id.
393 657 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1981).
"3 Section 404(b) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 404(b), 49 U.S.C. § 1374(b)
(1976).
"' 657 F.2d at 512.
'Id.
Id.
"' 618 F.2d 661 (1980).
'" Id. at 662.
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overgrown with tall weeds.' Prior to this action, the execu-
trix of the pilot's estate brought an action against the United
States in the United States District Court for Nebraska. 40 1 In
that action, the United States refused to permit the plaintiff
insurance company to intervene on the ground that the insur-
ance company would not be bound by the action.02 The ear-
lier Nebraska suit was dismissed for failure of proof.4 8
In Federal Insurance, the United States moved for sum-
mary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff insurance company
was bound by the Nebraska order because it was bringing an
action by subrogration. 4 " The trial court determined that
since the United States had asserted that the plaintiff could
not be bound in the first action, the plaintiff could not now be
held bound by the Nebraska dismissal without making a
mockery of res judicata.405 The trial court then denied defen-
dant United States' motion for summary judgment and pro-
ceeded to trial.4 6
Without directly ruling on the validity of the trial court's
ruling, the appellate court observed that res judicata is an af-
firmative defense, which must be pleaded and proved by the
party asserting it.40 7 Because the United States offered no
such proof, but seemed to abandon its estoppel-res judicata
argument after the trial court denied its motion for summary
judgment, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that
any reliance on that argument had been abandoned. 40 8 There-
fore, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment for the
plaintiff.409
400 Id.
402 Id. In that suit the plaintiff became subrogated to the claims of the representa-
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VIII. CHOICE-OF-LAW CASES
In In Re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois,"0 the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals was forced to decide which
law applied to the issue of punitive damages. One hundred
eighteen wrongful death actions arising out of the Chicago-
O'Hare DC-10 disaster of May 1979 were filed in six states or
territories by representatives of decedents who had resided in
twelve states or territories and three foreign countries." One
of the defendants, McDonnell Douglas Corp., was a Maryland
corporation with its principal place of business in Missouri
and its manufacturing facility in California.412 The other de-
fendant, American Airlines, had its principal place of business
in New York until the year of the accident, when it moved to
Texas."" American also had a maintenance facility in
Oklahoma where its misconduct was alleged to have oc-
curred.414 In an opinion which is now regarded as a textbook
on the modern choice-of-law, the Seventh Circuit chose the
law of Illinois, the place of the accident, which does not allow
punitive damages.41
Because all of the cases had been filed as diversity actions,
the court first established that the choice-of-law rules of those
states where the actions were originally filed would be used.41
The court then announced that it would apply the principle of
4 644 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1981).
"' Id. at 604. The decedents were residents of California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illi-
nois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Vermont, Puerto
Rico, Japan, the Netherlands, and Saudi Arabia. Id.
412 Id.
413 Id.
"' Id. at 605. The district court had allowed the motion to strike punitive damages
against defendant American Airlines in the Illinois cases because, under Illinois
choice-of-law principles, the law of the principal place of business would apply. For
American Airlines the district court held that the principal place of business would be
New York and New York does not allow punitive damages. The district court, how-
ever, retained the damage claim for punitive damages against defendant McDonnell
Douglas because its principal place of business was Missouri which allows punitive
damages. The same results were reached in the California, New York, Michigan, Ha-
waii and Puerto Rico cases, but on slightly different grounds. Id.
411 Id. at 625-26.
411 Id. at 610.
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"depecage"' 17 under which courts are guided by "the notion
that we must examine the choice-of-law rules not with regard
to various states' interests in general, but precisely, with re-
gard to each state's interest in the specific question of puni-
tive damages."41 8 The court proceeded to describe the analysis
as "the process of applying rules of different states on the ba-
sis of the precise issue involved. 4 1 9
The court then examined the choice-of-law rules of each of
the states to determine the applicable law of punitive dam-
ages.420 It is in this lengthy analysis that the character of the
opinion becomes apparent. 21 The court applied almost all of
the available choice-of-law principles. 422
In Air Crash Disaster, the court engaged in an analysis of
the reasons for which states allow or disallow punitive dam-
ages.428 The court observed that a state which allows punitive
damages is concerned with punishing the defendant and de-
terring others. 42 4 On the other hand, a state which disallows
punitive damages has as its purpose the prevention of exces-
sive damage awards."5 Using these observations, the court
then analyzed the interests of the several states regarding ap-
plication of their punitive damages laws.42"
The court began its analysis with an examination of the
"significant relationship" test of the Restatement (Second) of
411 Id. at 611. The court stated that "there is only one relevant issue: the choice-of-
law regarding punitive damages. Thus we use the term [depecagel here to mean a
precise focus on the purpose of and policies behind the decision to either allow or
disallow punitive damages." Id. at 611 n.13.
410 644 F.2d at 611.
41' Id.
,2o Id. at 611-32. Each defendant's contacts with each state in which the cases were
brought is discussed separately. Id.
421 Id.
42 Id.
423 Id. at 609-10.
44 Id. at 622.
411 Id. at 610. It seems, however, that there is yet another purpose served by an
award of punitive damages. This purpose is the enhancement of the award to the
plaintiff. It is quite certain that this costly litigation is totally unconcerned with the
legislative purposes of punishment and deterrence versus the prevention of excessive
awards. It is concerned with the damages available to the plaintiff from the defen-
dant's pocket.
4,1 Id. at 611-32.
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Conflict of Laws which is the Illinois choice-of-law rule.427
This test presumes that, in tort cases, the law of the place of
the injury applies, unless another state has a "more significant
relationship" with the event or the parties. 2 8 Although the
court considered the criteria laid down by the Restatement, it
seemed to rest its decision upon balancing the contacts Mc-
Donnell Douglas had with its state of incorporation (Mis-
souri), with the state of misconduct (California, where the
plane was built), and with the place of injury (Illinois).429 Mis-
souri had an interest in allowing punitive damages in order to
control the conduct of its corporations. 30 California, on the
other hand, had an interest in protecting a domestic corpora-
tion against excessive liability because the corporation could
have been induced to locate in the state by the California rule
against punitive damages.4 81 The court decided that Illinois'
interests were paramount to those of Missouri and California
because of its interest in promoting airline transportation and
safety within Illinois, and its involvement in the aftermath of
the accident.'3 2 The court concluded by commending the pre-
dictability of the Illinois choice-of-law rule:
[A]ir transportation companies will now be on notice that,
under the "most significant relationship" test, when there is a
true conflict between laws of states having equal interests in
the issue of punitive damages, and when the place of injury has
a strong interest in air safety and in protection of air transpor-
tation corporations, the law of the place of the injury will
apply.483
Choice-of-law questions seem to be among the most difficult
issues courts are called upon to settle. One example of the dif-
ficulty that courts have had with these questions is the Sev-
enth Circuit decision of Pittway Corp. v. Lockheed Aircraft
427 Id. at 611.
428 Id.
"'9 Id. at 615-16.
80 Id. at 613.
I' ld. at 614.
Id. at 615-16.
,3 Id. at 616.
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Corp.34 The court considered an action for damage to an air-
craft resulting from a cracked frame and the economic loss
caused by the unavailability of the airplane for its intended
purposes..43  The action was based upon diversity of citizen-
ship and was filed in Illinois. 3 Illinois was the plaintiff's
principal place of business, where the airplane was hangared,
and the location from which the airplane was customarily op-
erated.3 7 Illinois does not permit recovery for economic
1oss.438 The airplane was manufactured by the defendant in
Georgia .4 9 A defect in the frame was discovered at a repair
facility in Wisconsin, where the airplane was flown after the
manufacturer notified users of the possibility of main frame
cracks and after an effort to perform the inspection in
Illinois. °
The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court, which had
held that the case was governed by Wisconsin law permitting
recovery of purely economic damages in product liability tort
actions.44 1 The appellate court, applying the Illinois choice-of-
law rule,'4 found that Illinois law controlled.44 3 The court re-
jected the trial court's conclusion that the place where the de-
fect was discovered was the place of the injury, because it
found that the place where the crack actually occurred was
indeterminable.' Additionally, the court found that Georgia
and Illinois had greater relationships to the litigation.445 Both
states bar recovery of economic damages in products liability
484 641 F.2d 524 (7th Cir. 1981).
" Id. at 525.
4" Id.
487 Id. at 525-26.
4" Id. at 525.
4" Id.
440 Id. at 526.
I41 d. at 529.
44 Id. at 526. Illinois applies the "most significant relationship" test of the Re-
statement (Second) of the Conflict of Laws to determine the applicable law in tort
actions. Id.
48 Id. at 529.
4" Id. at 527-28.
"4 Id. at 528-29. The court noted that the economic harm suffered by the plaintiff
occurred in Illinois and that Lockheed was among those intended to be protected by
the Georgia law barring recovery of economic damages. Id.
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actions." The court concluded that the policy behind Geor-
gia's rule barring recovery of economic damages was to "pro-
tect the economic well-being of Georgia manufacturers. . by
limiting the scope of potential liability for product defects to
that established contractually by the parties." 7 This goal was
in accord with the Illinois rule, thus Illinois law controlled.
In Bodnar v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,'" an action filed in an
Alabama circuit court for the wrongful death in Georgia of a
Georgia resident, the Alabama Supreme Court adhered
strictly to the rule of lex loci delicti in holding that the Geor-
gia statute of limitations applied rather than the Alabama
statute." 9 Despite the plaintiff's adroit argument that the Al-
abama statute of limitations applied as part of the procedural
law of the forum because the Georgia wrongful death statute
did not incorporate the Georgia statute of limitations, the
court in Bodnar held that this was not the proper case for the
court to depart from the traditional conflict of laws rule, lex
loci delicti."80 The court stated that, even if it were persuaded
to do so, it "would not necessarily apply the law of a state
other than that compelled under the existing rule" because
Alabama's contacts with the action did not outweigh the fact
that the cause of action accrued in Georgia." 1
In Bishop v. Florida Specialty Paint Co.,"'5 the Florida Su-
preme Court abandoned the conflict of laws rule of lex loci
delecti and adopted the "significant relationship test" set
forth in Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws sections
145-146." 8 In rejecting the lex loci delicti doctrine, the court
4" Id. at 525.
47 Id. at 528-29.
448 392 So.2d 1161 (Ala. 1980).
41 Georgia has a general two-year statute of limitations which is codified at GA.
CODE ANN. § 3-1004 (1975). Alabama has a general one-year statute of limitations
which is codified at ALA. CODE § 6-2-39 (1975).
M Id. at 1163. The court, citing Spencer v. Malone Freight Lines, Inc., 292 Ala.
582, 298 So. 2d. 20 (1974), noted that it had "consistently" adhered to the lex loci
delicti rule to determine which substantive law to apply in multistate tort actions."
Id.
" Id. at 1164.
" 389 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1980).
." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 145-146 (1971).
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stressed the need for a more flexible rule, particularly in the
case of aviation accidents, because the state of the injury may
have little actual significance to the cause of action.4 " The
court concluded that the "significant relationship test" made
the determination of applicable law "a less mechanical, and a
more rational process. 4 55
IX. CASES ON RECORDATION OF SECURITY INTERESTS AND
CERTAIN OTHER CONTRACT AND UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
PROBLEMS
CIM International v. United States,"6 a case concerning
the frequently troublesome section 1403(c) of Title 49 of the
United States Code, 57 continued its sorry progress through
the courts. Section 1403(c) starkly states that "[n]o convey-
ance or instrument the recording of which is provided for by
subsection (a) of this section shall be valid in respect of such
aircraft. . . against any person. . . until such conveyance or
other instrument is filed for recordation in the office of the
Secretary of Transportation."458 In CIM, Austin, a delinquent
taxpayer, purchased an airplane from Woodall, giving
Woodall only a promissory note for the entire purchase price,
secured by an agreement granting a security interest in the
plane. 59 Austin filed an ownership statement with the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) pursuant to section 1403.'
Woodall assigned its interest to Emliire Savings Bank of
Springfield, Missouri, with recourse.461 Empire filed with the
Secretary of State of Nevada a financing statement which dis-
closed the respective interests of Empire, Woodall and Aus-
tin.4 62 Austin did not make scheduled payments on the prom-
issory note, therefore, Empire reassigned all of its interests to
I" Id. at 1001-02.
455 Id. at 1002.
,- 641 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1980).
4 1 49 U.S.C. § 1403(c) (1976).
458 Id.
,- 641 F.2d at 672.
4" Id.
461 Id.
462 Id. at 673-74.
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Woodall and released Woodall from its "with recourse" obli-
gation.4 683 The United States thereafter filed two tax liens with
the State of Nevada on property belonging to Austin, but did
not file with the FAA and did not examine the FAA regis-
try.4 '" Thereafter CIM purchased Woodall's interests, ob-
tained a bill of sale from Austin, and filed an ownership regis-
tration certificate with the FAA. 465 While the airplane was
being used under the authority of CIM, it was seized by the
United States for Austin's nonpayment of taxes.' 6
CIM began an action against the United States, eventually
paid the taxes to secure release of the airplane, and then
sought a refund of wrongfully collected taxes.4a The district
court held that, because Woodall had not recorded the reas-
signment to it by Empire of the security interest, Woodall had
only an unperfected security interest.4" 8 Further, the court de-
termined that any right, title or interest acquired by Woodall
was extinguished when Empire filed a notice of the release
and reassignment to Woodall with the FAA on September 27,
1977469 Because CIM succeeded only to the right title or in-
terest held by Woodall, which was nothing at the time of the
purchase, the federal tax lien was superior to any interests
claimed by either Woodall or CIM.47 0
The court of appeals described the purpose of the section
1403(c) recording provisions as being one of protecting per-
sons who have relied on the FAA register and of protecting
good faith purchasers' security interests against unregistered
interest holders.7  The court firmly rejected the literal inter-
pretation of section 1403(c) suggested by the United States,
that nonregistration invalidated a security interest.'7 The
court stressed that the statute was designed merely to provide





4" Id. at 674.





a convenient, single registry for instruments affecting title to
aircraft.7 8 The court further observed that the validity of any
instrument recorded under the act was determined by appli-
cable state law.47 4 Because Empire's interest in the aircraft
was on file with the State of Nevada and the FAA when the
United States filed its tax lien, the court concluded that the
purpose of section 1403 would not be thwarted by holding
that Woodall's interest was superior to that of the United
States.78
The court reasoned that CIM, an innocent purchaser who
had relied on the FAA register, would be penalized if the
court were to treat section 1403 as a race statute.47 Addition-
ally, the court noted that CIM could not have learned of Aus-
tin's tax liability from the FAA register, but that the govern-
ment would have discovered Empire's interest and subsequent
reassignment of that interest to Woodall if it had examined
the FAA register prior to its seizure of the airplane.'" The
court concluded that the practice of the United States of
"seize first and determine rights later," regardless of the exis-
tence of security interests on file with the FAA, favored par-
ties who totally ignored the FAA register to the detriment of
parties who respected it.478 Therefore, the court of appeals re-
versed the summary judgment granted by the district court
and held that the seizure did not destroy CIM's senior lien
because "a security interest in an aircraft is not necessarily
invalid against all parties for all purposes and under all con-
ditons solely because it is not filed with the FAA.' ' 79
In Holiday Airlines Corp. v. World Airways,'8 0 another case
concerning noncompliance with the recording provisions of
section 1403," the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a
473 Id.
474 Id. at 675.




79' Id. at 678.
40 647 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1981).
481 49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1976).
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consensual lien perfected by possession is not invalid for fail-
ure to be recorded under section 1403.482 Holiday Airlines
Corp. (Holiday) owned one plane and was the lessee of an-
other. Shortly before Holiday was declared bankrupt in 1975,
it granted World Airways (World) a chattel mortgage on one
of its planes, #974, to secure the $70,165.65 it owed World for
maintenance, repair and overhaul of a plane, #971, that Holi-
day had leased from a third party.83 Immediately thereafter,
plane #974 was sold and World received payment for services
performed on plane #971.484 Because the chattel mortgage on
plane #974 was never filed with the FAA pursuant to section
1403, Holiday's trustee in bankruptcy asserted that World's
claim to the proceeds of the sale of #974 was no better than
that of a general creditor, and thus, that satisfaction of the
$70,165.65 debt owed World by Holiday, with proceeds from
the sale of plane #974 constituted a preference.48
The court rejected the trustee's argument, concluding that
the consensual lien of World under its agreement with Holi-
day was perfected by its possession of the aircraft. 8 In addi-
tion, the court noted that the lien was not invalid, under the
language of section 1403, merely because it was not recorded
in the FAA registry.487 The court emphasized that its holding
was limited to a case in which the lienholder was in possession
of the chattel."88 The court reasoned that the transaction in
which the chattel mortgage on plane #974 was given to secure
payment for services performed on plane #971, which World
had released once the mortgage was executed, was "a substi-
tution of one security for another," rather than a preference,
because it did not diminish the bankrupt estate.48'
The court in Bitzer Croft Motors v. Pioneer Bank and
482 647 F.2d at 980.
Ia ld. at 978-79.
484 Id. at 979.
465 Id.
486 Id. at 981.
401 Id. at 979-80.
488 Id. at 980.
"I Id. at 982.
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Trust Co.490 ruled that the holder of a security interest in an
airplane, recorded in the FAA registry, who authorized the
debtor to remain in possession of the airplane and to sell it as
part of the business, is estopped from asserting its security
interest against a good faith purchaser of the airplane, even
though the purchaser did not record its interest in the air-
plane. 4 '9 In a pattern frequently repeated in cases involving
this problem, Bitzer-Croft purchased a Piper Lance from
Southern Illinois Aviation, Inc. (Southern) and granted a se-
curity interest in the plane to Belleville Bank as part of a loan
agreement. 492 On the day of sale, Southern borrowed money
from Pioneer Bank and gave Pioneer a chattel mortgage se-
curity interest in the aircraft.4 9 Pioneer, after finding no prior
registration of aircraft ownership or any other interest in the
plane, filed the chattel mortgage, along with the three original
bills of sale, in the FAA register on November 28, 1977.""
Bitzer-Croft never filed its bills of sale. The conflicting inter-
ests in the plane were discovered when Belleville Bank ex-
amined the federal register and found a recorded security in-
terest in favor of Pioneer Bank.4 "
Because the agreement between Southern and its lender,
Pioneer Bank, authorized Southern to remain in possession of
the airplane and to sell it, the court held that Pioneer Bank
was estopped to assert its security interest in the airplane
against a purchaser, who was entitled to possession of and a
free title to the airplane it had purchased in the ordinary
course of business, notwithstanding the fact that the good
faith purchaser had not filed its interest with the FAA. 4" The
court concluded, as did the court in CIM International and
Holiday Airlines, that the provisions of the Federal Aviation
Act pertaining to recordation of interests in aircraft were in-
tended merely to provide a single place of registration and not
4" 82 Ill. App. 3d 1, 401 N.E.2d 1340 (1980).
49' 401 N.E.2d at 1346-47.
492 Id. at 1342.
403 Id. at 1342-43.
494 Id. at 1343.
495 Id.
49 Id. at 1346-47.
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to validate interests and titles.4 97
In U.C. Leasing, Inc. v. Laughlin,"" the appellant (lessor)
entered into a contract with the respondent (lessee) in which
the lessor purported to "lease" the respondent an airplane.4 99
The contract was to run for five years with a monthly rental
of $1,144. At the end of that period, the lessor was to regain
possession of the airplane.500 The contract also allowed the
lessee to sell the airplane if it became unsuitable for use. The
lessee was entitled to the proceeds of the sale, if he paid the
lessor the amount then owing under the contract plus
$5,500.501 Finally, the lessee was to bear all risk of loss, pay all
taxes and fees, and pay all insurance premiums.502 The lessor
disclaimed all implied or expressed warranties.503
The lessee made nine monthly installments before default-
ing. The lessor repossessed the airplane and it was later
sold. 04 The lessor then brought suit, seeking damages in the
amount of the difference between the money due under the
contract plus $5500 and the proceeds received from the
sale.50 5
The district court held that the contract was a "security
lease ''50 subject to the Uniform Commercial Code of Ne-
vada, 07 and that the lessor was precluded from recovering a
deficiency because he refused lessee's offer to redeem the air-
plane as fulfillment of the terms of the contract.508 In deter-
mining that the lease was one intended for security, the dis-
trict court compared the option price to the total rentals.50 9
"7 Id. at 1345.
498 606 P.2d 167 (Nev. 1980).
'" Id. at 168.
"0 Id. at 168-69.
"' Id. at 169.
801 Id.
803 Id.
804 Id. at 169.
808 Id. at 168.
808 NEV. REV. STAT. § 104.9105,1.(1) (1973). "Security agreement" means an agree-
ment which provides for or creates a security interest. Id.
"7 606 P.2d 167 (Nev. 1980).
' Id. at 170. Cf. Granite Equip. Leasing Corp. v. Acme Pump Co., Inc., 335 A.2d
294 (1973).
809 Id. at 170, NEV. REV. STAT. §" 104.1201(37)(b) (1973) (defines security interest as
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Because neither party proffered evidence at trial of the fair
market value of the plane at the end of the lease period, the
Supreme Court of Nevada found it impossible for the trial
court to use this criterion to determine whether the plane
could have been purchased for nominal consideration.5 10
The state supreme court ruled that the lease was subject to
Nevada's Code, because the lessee was required to perform,
and the lease, the rental payment, and the option price
equaled the purchase price plus approximately eleven percent
interest.5 11 In addition, the lessee had an option to become
owner of the airplane.5 12 The state supreme court further held
that, because the lessor produced no evidence of the fair mar-
ket value of the airplane at the time the lessee's offer of re-
demption was refused, it is presumed that the collateral had a
fair market value equal to the amount of the debt. A defi-
ciency judgment, therefore, was not permitted and the lessor
was not entitled to recover.5 18
X. THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act 514 prohib-
its regulations which are "(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (B)
contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limita-
tions."5 15 A regulation of the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) governing the testimony of Board employees
teeters, in the eyes of many, on the brink of the abyss de-
scribed in section 706.611 Among other prohibitions and re-
strictions, the NTSB regulation prohibits employees of the
Board from testifying to matters beyond the scope of an in-
vestigation conducted by them and from giving opinion testi-
applied to options in leases).




514 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976).
o Id. § 706(2).
See 49 C.F.R. § 835 (1981).
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mony concerning the cause of the accident. 17
The regulation was perhaps pushed closer to the edge by
the decision of the district court in Vaca v. The Boeing Com-
pany.51 The court in Vaca not only upheld the right of the
Board to adopt such a regulation, but granted defendant's
motion to strike the deposition testimony of a Board em-
ployee which did not comply with those regulations.""
In Vaca, the Board expert who had not conducted the in-
vestigation at all was called merely as an expert and testified
under subpoena.520 The court cited the usual Board reasons
for its practice of isolating its employees except in limited cir-
cumstances,2 1 and rejected an argument by plaintiff that,
since the accident was a foreign accident, the regulations did
not apply.522 The court also rejected plaintiff's argument that
the regulations did not apply because the witness testified in
his personal capacity, not as an employee of the Board. The
court took the view that the regulation applied to persons who
are or were employees of the Board. 2
XI. CASES DEALING WITH PILOTS
In Jenson v. Administrator of the Federal Aviation Admin-
istration,524 the court held section C of the Comprehensive Al-
cohol Abuse and Alcoholism Prevention, Treatment, and Re-
habilitation Act of 1977 (Act)52 5 superseded the terms of
Federal Aviation Regulations section 67.15.5" Section 67.15
requires that, in order to be eligible for a second-class medical
certificate, the applicant must have no established medical
history of alcoholism.527 The Act, on the other hand, provides
that no person "may be denied. . . a Federal professional or
s1 49 C.F.R. § 835.3(b) (1981).






641 F.2d 797 (9th Cir. 1981).
s' 42 U.S.C. § 4561 (1976).
"' 14 C.F.R. § 67.15(d)(ii) (1976).
527 Id.
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other license or right solely on the grounds of prior alcohol
abuse or prior alcoholism." 52 8
The dissenting opinion suggested that a medical certificate
might not be a license and that the medical history of prior
alcohol abuse or alcoholism was not the sole ground for the
denial of the certificate.8 9 The dissent pointed out that con-
siderations of public safety and the uncertainty of medical
knowledge about alcoholism formed the basis for the regula-
tion's denial of the medical certificate in cases where there
was an established medical history of alcoholism.5 °
The court rejected the FAA's argument that the availability
of an exemption,83 1 upon application to the administrator, ne-
gated the contention that the certificate might be denied
solely on the ground of prior alcoholism because there was no
appeal of the denial of any exemption petition before the
court. The court suggested, however, that the exemption pro-
cedure itself did not comport with due process because it did
not provide sufficiently specific standards to give the court a
basis for review.3 2
In Smallwood v. United Airlines, Inc.,53 a requirement by
United Airlines that applicants for positions as flight officer
be under the age of 35 was held by the Fourth Circuit not to
be a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ).5" The
court held that economic considerations resulting from an at-
tenuation of the value received by the employer when a
latecomer to the organization received the same training and
retraining given an early comer, could not be used in deter-
mining whether a qualification was a BFOQ.53 5 The court also
held that the safety considerations advanced by United, to the
effect that a latecomer would not blend as easily with crews
long-experienced in the ways of the company, and that the
42 U.S.C. § 4561(c)(2) (1976).
"' 641 F.2d at 800 (Trask, J., dissenting).
Id. at 800.
", Id. at 799; 14 C.F.R. § 11.27(e) (1980).
"' 641 F.2d 797, 799 (9th Cir. 1981).
8as 661 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3979 (U.S. June 1, 1982).
::4 19 U.S.C. § 623.
11 661 F.2d at 307.
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incidence of cockpit medical emergencies would increase, were
not supported by the evidence."'
XII. CASES DEALING WITH NOISE ABATEMENT AND THE
AVIGATION EASEMENT
In Owen v. City of Atlanta,587 the court considered the
question of whether plaintiffs' damage claims for trespass and
nuisance, resulting from the expansion of the use of the city of
Atlanta's Hartsfield International Airport, "were preempted
by federal regulation of aircraft flights."538 Defendant con-
ceded that plaintiffs stated a case of inverse condemnation,
but moved for summary judgment on the counts sounding in
trespass and nuisance, basing the motion on a theory of pre-
emption." 9 The court held that "the grant of partial summary
judgment to the [defendant] on the theory that [plaintiffs']
claims . . . were barred by federal preemption must be
reversed. '640
In defining preemption the court quoted Cooley v. Board of
Wardens:5'4  "Whatever subjects of this power [to regulate
commerce] are in their nature national, or admit only of one
uniform system, or plan of regulation, may justly be said to be
of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Con-
gress. '04 2 Thus, it is quite apparent that federal preemption is
concerned with exclusive occupation of an area of legislation
or regulation and not with any cognate area of common law
remedy. The actions in Owen were for damages for trespass
and nuisance. There was no question of competition between
federal regulation of aviation and regulation of its airport by
the City of Atlanta.54 8 In this view, the discussion by the court
of the distinction made in the famous footnote 14 of City of
'" Id. at 307-08.
157 Ga. App. 354, 277 S.E.2d 338 (1981), aff'd per curiam, 248 Ga. 299, 282
S.E.2d 906 (1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.LW. 3916 (U.S. May 18, 1982).
838 277 S.E.2d at 339.
Id.
840 Id. at 341.
" 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
Id. at 319 (emphasis added).
' Owen v. City of Atlanta, 277 S.E.2d 338 (1981).
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Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal,84 between the city as
city and the city as airport owner and operator seems alto-
gether irrelevant. The Owen court summarized its holding in a
useful statement, shedding real light upon what was meant by
preemption, as follows:
Preemption is, in our opinion, a doctrine which ousts a state
or other government from the exercise of its police power in an
area in which the power of the federal government is, by law or
by implications, preeminent. Florida etc. Avocado Growers,
373 U.S. at 141, 142 83 S.Ct. at 1216-1217 .... It is not a
doctrine which invests an airport proprietor with impenetrable
immunity from such liability as may arise from that proprie-
torship. Neither is preemption a doctrine behind which an air-
port proprietor whose facility creates a "nuisance" may hide,
urging that its hands are tied because federal regulation has
preempted all matters dealing with aircraft flights. "Nothing
contained in this Chapter [the Federal Aviation Program] shall
in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at com-
mon law or by statute, but the provisions of this Chapter are in
addition to such remedies." 49 U.S.C.A. § 1506. The proprietor
of an airport must bear its rightful share of the legal liability
411 U.S. 624, 635-36 n.14 (1973). Footnote 14 states:
The letter from the Secretary of Transportation also expressed the
view that "the proposed legislation will not affect the rights of a State
or local public agency, as the proprietor of an airport, from issuing
regulations or establishing reguirements as to the permissible level of
noise which can be created by aircraft using the airport. Airport own-
ers acting as proprietors can presently deny the use of their airports
to aircraft on the basis of noise considerations so long as such exclu-
sion is nondiscriminatory." (Emphasis added.) This portion as well as
quoted with approval in the Senate Report. Ibid.
Appellants and the Solicitor General submit that this indicates that
a municipality with jurisdicition over an airport has the power to im-
pose a curfew on the airport, notwithstanding federal responsibility in
the area. But, we are concerned here not with an ordinance imposed
by the City of Burbank as "proprietor" of the airport, but with the
exercise of police power. While the Hollywood-Burbank Airport may
be the only major airport which is privately owned, many airports are
owned by one municipality yet physically located in another. For ex-
ample, the principal airport serving Cincinnati is located in Kentucky.
Thus, authority that a municipality may have as a landlord is not nec-
essarily congruent with its police power. We do not consider here what
limits, if any, apply to a municipality as a proprietor.
Id. at 635-36 n.14.
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for all the damage and loss resulting from and occasioned by
its facility.""
Thus the position of the court may be restated as excluding
from the scope of the federal preemption doctrine the rights
of a person affected by the exercise of the rights provided
under the preemptive federal regulation. But the question re-
mains as to whether the Congress, having filled a field subject
to the exercise of the police power in all of its manifestations,
has left any room for the states to act in a way contrary to
that preemption.
In San Diego Unified Port District v. Gianturco, " the
court held that the federal preemption of noise control at air-
ports, proclaimed in City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Termi-
nal, Inc.,541 was unabated by the Quiet Communities Act of
1978," 8 and that the State of California, operating through its
Department of Transportation, did not enjoy the limited priv-
ilege of regulation within that federal enclave granted to air-
port proprietors by footnote 14 of City of Burbank."9 Thus,
the court held that the stringent regulations promulgated by
the Department of Transportation of California remained
under injunction.550
The innocent-appearing, but possibly very deceptive dis-
tinction made by the Supreme Court in its famous footnote 14
in City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal," 1 between an
ordinance-adopting city as airport and as a city proprietor was
used by the court of appeals in Santa Monica Airport Associ-
ation v. City of Santa Monica,"" in support of its holding
that airport noise ordinances adopted by the City of Santa
Monica were not within a field preempted by the United
"' 277 S.E.2d. at 340.
04 651 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir. 1981).
- 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
"' Pub. L. No. 95-609, 92 Stat. 3079 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4901, 4913
(1978)).
"1 411 U.S. at 635. See supra note 544 and accompanying text.
550 651 F.2d 1306.
'z 411 U.S. at 635. See supra note 544 and accompanying text.
'l 647 F.2d 3 (9th Cir. 1981) (deleted from the bound version of the Federal Re-
porter at the request of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals).
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States' comprehensive federal regulation of aviation.' "  The
court concluded that "Congressional intent not to preempt all
regulation by municipal proprietors is clear" and, thus, held
that the Santa Monica ordinances were not preempted.5"
In a similar vein, the court in Joseph v. Bond555 held that
plaintiffs, who were not the property owners at the time an
easement for avigation was alleged to have been taken by the
United States, could not bring an action for damages for the
taking.5" The opinion did not discuss the possibility of an as-
signment of the cause of action at the time of the conveyance
and implied thereby that an assignment was not possible. 5 7
An old comic strip character used to express his frustration
from week to week with the statement, "Curses! Foiled
again!" 5" Thus might the residents of South Boston, repulsed
at every turn, express themselves about the opinion in DiPerri
v. Federal Aviation Administration.5 Their action against
the FAA and the Massachusetts Port Authority for damages
for a taking of their properties adjacent to Logan Interna-
tional Airport, occasioned by regular and frequent intrusions
by airplanes and by the noise, vibration and pollution they
create, was held barred by the statute of limitations set out by
the Tucker Act."0 The plaintiffs alleged that the taking of
their property began in 1965 and that the action was filed
fifteen. years later. Similar claims against Massachusetts were
held barred by the Massachusetts general statute of
limitations." 1
The court held also that plaintiffs' equal protection claims
against both defendants were inappropriate because there was
evidence of a legitimate governmental interest, but no evi-
"3 Id.
'54 Id.
65 16 Av. Cas. 17,591 (D.D.C. 1981).
" Id.
557 Id.
8" Hanna-Barbera, Snidely Whiplash.
"' 16 Av. Cas. 17,533 (D. Mass. 1981), alf'd in part, 16 Av. Cas. 18,221 (1st Cir.
1982).92 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1976) (the Act provides for a statute of limitations of six years
in actions against the United States).
I41 16 Av. Cas. 18,221, 18,222 (1st Cir. 1981).
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dence of discrimination.5" The court further held that plain-
tiffs failed to make a case under the Federal Tort Claims
Act 5" because they had failed to exhaust their administrative
remedies under that act." As to the action for injunctive re-
lief against the FAA, the court held that, to the extent the
plaintiffs sought invalidation of flight pattern regulations, an
injunction would not lie because of federal preemption." 5 The
court added that, if the plaintiffs sought an injunction against
access to the airport by aircraft not complying with noise
standards of the FAA, the action should be against the State
of Massachusetts as the airport operator, rather than against
the FAA. Having dismissed the plaintiffs' federal claims, the
court refused to exercise pendant jurisdiction over the plain-
tiffs' state claims.5 "
XIII. SEIZURE OF AIRCRAFT
The interesting question of whether a statute may constitu-
tionally provide for the deprivation by condemnation of the
property rights of a security interest holder in an airplane, be-
cause of the craft's use in the commission of a crime, was
raised and answered in State of Alaska v. Rice." 7 Cessna was
the holder of a security interest in an airplane used in the
commission of a wild game offense. It moved for summary
judgment in the forfeiture proceeding on the ground of viola-
tion of the due process clauses of the United States Constitu-
tion and the Constitution of the State of Alaska." 8 The court
discussed the development of the law of forfeiture, stating
that it reached a pinnacle in the Supreme Court case of
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. 5"9 In Calero-To-
ledo, the Supreme Court held that, though forfeiture was gen-
erally acceptable under the standards therein laid down, there
Id. (citing 16 Av. Cas 17,533-34 (D. Mass. 1981)).
6- 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671, 2675(a) (1976).
16 Av. Cas. 17,535.
6Id.
/" Id.
" 626 P.2d 104 (Ala. 1981).
Id. at 107.
" 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
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remained some exceptions to this rule. One exception oc-
curred when forfeiture of an owner's interest was provided for
by the statute, but the owner "proved not only that he was
uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful activity, but also
that he had done all that reasonably could be expected to pre-
vent the proscribed use of his property. 5 70 In such a case the
Supreme Court observed that "it would be difficult to con-
clude that forfeiture served legitimate purposes and was not
unduly oppressive."'5 7' The Alaska court observed, however,
that the purpose of the statutory forfeiture requirement, as
applied to the interest of an owner who was not involved in
the offense, was to induce the owner to exercise the greatest
care in transferring possession of the airplane. The court
therefore held that the forfeiture of Cessna's interest did not
violate the federal Constitution. 7 2
Nevertheless, the court found that under the Alaska Consti-
tution it is necessary to provide a procedure for remission of
the forfeiture in the case of an owner who was not involved in
the commission of the offense. 73 In such a procedure the own-
er might show that he was not involved in the crime and that
he was not negligent in transferring possession to the offender.
Because the Alaska statute did not provide for such a scheme,
the matter was remanded to the superior court with instruc-
tions to hold a remission hearing. 74
In United States v. Lockheed L-188 Aircraft,5 75 the United
States seized an aircraft because the pilot/lessee violated fed-
eral aviation regulations. The United States subsequently
brought a forfeiture action in the district court.5 76 The owner
filed a counterclaim in the suit, under the Tucker Act,57 7 and
attempted to amend its counterclaim by stating a cause of ac-
:70 Id. at 689.
'7, Id. at 689-90.
:72 626 P.2d at 112.
71 Id. at 113.
:74 Id. at 115.
76 656 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1979).
576 Id. at 393.
.77 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (1976).
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tion under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 78 The owner asserted
that the government violated his constitutional rights by tak-
ing the airplane without due process.579 Plaintiff argued that
he was not given due process because the airplane was seized
before he had notice, and because there was no pre-seizure
hearing. 80 The court noted that the circuits had not decided
uniformly whether a counterclaim could be brought under the
Tucker Act, 81 but said that it would not decide that question
because plaintiff could have raised his constitutional defense
in the forfeiture proceeding. The court added that its decision
did not preclude the plaintiff from bringing an independent
action in the district court or court of claims against the
United States under the Tucker Act.'2 In evaluating the
FTCA claim the court held that the Act contained an excep-
tion in favor of the United States in connection with a claim
for "the detention of [any] goods" by a United States officer.
It therefore denied plaintiff's action. 88
XIV. OVERBOOKING
In the latest installment of the continuing saga of Ralph
Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc.,84 the court of appeals has
held that the knowledgeable and knowing consumer advocate,
who was bumped by the defendant-air carrier, was not enti-
tled either to compensatory or punitive damages. Compensa-
tory damages were denied on his claim of fraudulent misrep-
resentation against the airline because he was aware that the
common practice among airlines was to overbook.' s ' Punitive
damages were denied on the same claim because the defen-
dant was only doing what had been approved by the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB), by failing to publicize to its pa-
trons that it was engaging in the practice of deliberate
578 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976).
179 656 F.2d at 393, 397.
"0 Id. at 394.
*e' Id. at 396.
Id. at 397 (emphasis added).
"'Id.
584 626 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1980).




In Nevada Airlines v. Bond,5 8 7 the cause of action arose
when the operating certificate of Nevada Airlines was revoked
under an emergency revocation order of the Federal Aviation
Administrator, who cited numerous violations of federal avia-
tion regulations by the commuter carrier. 88 Nevada Airlines
brought the action in the United States District Court seeking
an injunction against enforcement of the emergency revoca-
tion order pending appeal of the order to the NTSB. The dis-
trict court dismissed plaintiff's suit for injunction on the
ground that it lacked jurisdiction.5 8 9 The court of appeals
agreed. The court of appeals asserted that, notwithstanding
the availability of further administrative proceedings for a re-
view of the revocation order, it had jurisdiction under §
1006(a) of the Federal Aviation Act of 195890 to review any
order of the Federal Aviation Administrator issued by the ad-
ministrator under his statutory powers. 9' The emergency or-
der of revocation was such an order. The court of appeals then
went on to hold that this jurisdiction was exclusive and that
the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the injunc-
tive action."' The court held, finally, that there was no show-
ing by the plaintiff sufficient to upset the administrator's de-
termination by demonstrating that the administrator acted
arbitrarily or capriciously.9 3
In Greater Tampa Chamber of Commerce v. Gold-
schmidt,5 4 a challenge to an executive agreement between the
United States and the United Kingdom, by which air travel
between the two countries is regulated, was dismissed for lack
86 Id.
"8 622 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 1019.
8 Id. at 1018.
49 U.S.C. § 1486(a) (1976).
622 F.2d at 1019.
: Id. at 1020.
I*' d. at 1021.
" 627 F.2d 258 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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of standing.95 The Greater Tampa Chamber of Commerce
and other groups and individuals who used international air
service alleged that the renegotiation of the Bermuda Agree-
ment of 1946 (Bermuda I)596 was "anti-competitive" to air ser-
vice.5 97 Under Bermuda I, no bilateral restrictions were im-
posed on the number of airlines which could fly from a
"gateway." 698 Under the new agreement (Bermuda I),1 91 how-
ever, the United Kingdom was allowed to limit thirteen gate-
ways to nonstop service by only one American carrier, and to
limit two gateways to nonstop service by two American
carriers.
Specifically, the plaintiffs cited four "procedural" flaws in
the agreement.600 First, since Bermuda II conflicted with those
sections of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, mandating com-
petition in air transportation,001 it was argued to be a treaty,
because only treaties override acts of Congress; therefore it re-
quired Senate approval which it had not received.60
Second, since 22 U.S.C. § 901(c) permits the President to
confer the personal rank of ambassador only for special, lim-
ited and temporary missions, and since this was not such a
mission, Alan S. Boyd's appointment as the chief negotiator
should have been submitted to the Senate for confirmation."3
Third, the Secretary of Transportation did not adequately
consult with the Civil Aeronautics Board while Bermuda II
was being negotiated."04 Finally, neither Mr. Boyd nor Secre-
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tary of Transportation Brock Adams was properly authorized
to sign Bermuda II for the United States.60 5 The district court
issued a memorandum order and concluded that plaintiffs had
standing because they were injured by a diminution in air ser-
vices. The court, however, granted summary judgment to de-
fendants as to plaintiffs' first and fourth allegations, and
granted their motion to dismiss the other allegations as non-
justiciable "political questions.""
The Court of Appeals remanded the case, with instructions
to dismiss the complaint for lack of standing, citing the Su-
preme Court's decision in Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Wel-
fare Rights Organization.0 7 The Supreme Court in Simon
held that Simon failed to show that the court could redress
the injury averred. "Absent such a showing, exercise of its
power by a federal court would be gratuitous and thus incon-
sistent with the Article III limitation. ' '960
In Greater Tampa, were the Senate to approve the agree-
ment, plaintiffs' circumstances would be exactly what they
were when they filed the complaint. Second, even if the Sen-
ate declined to approve the agreement, there remains the fact
that the United Kingdom completely controlled landing rights
within its boundaries. Therefore, absent a substantial likeli-
hood that a federal court could redress the injury plaintiffs
claimed to have suffered, the plaintiffs had no standing to in-
voke the power of a federal court.609
ment with foreign governments for the establishment or development
of air navigation, including air routes and services.
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